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GROTIUS REPUDIATED: THE AMERICANt
OBJECTIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT AND THE COMMITMENT
TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
Marcella David*
"We no longer live in a world where narrow conceptions of juris-
diction and sovereignty can stand in the way of an effective system of
international cooperation for the prevention and control of international
and transnational criminality."' In July 1998, in recognition of this in-
controvertible proposition, 120 states took the first steps towards the
creation of an international court with jurisdiction over the most serious
of international crime-aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes-by adopting the Rome Statute for the International
Criminal Court (the "Statute" or the "Rome Statute").
While the United States supported and participated in the drafting
process and final conference, it has announced its intent not to partici-
pate in the International Criminal Court (the "Court," the "Criminal
Court," or the ICC), and moreover, to actively discourage other states
from ratifying the Statute. The United States' objections focus on osten-
sible legal deficiencies in the Statute, which it argues will lead to absurd
results, trivialize the work of the proposed court, and lead to reduced
participation in international peacekeeping missions. Nationals of the
United States, it is asserted, are peculiarly at risk of being subjected to
frivolous and politically motivated charges precisely because of Ameri-
can involvement in matters of international security.
This article analyzes the American objections to the Statute. Part I
describes the historical precedents for a permanent international crimi-
nal court and the drafting process undertaken. Part I concludes with a
summary of the sections of the Statute which are implicated by the
t I repeat here the eloquent "apology" of Louis Henkin: "I use the adjective
'American' with apologies to inhabitants of other American Republics because it is often
awkward to use 'United States' as an adjective." Louis Henkin, International Human Rights
and Rights in the United States, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND
POLICY ISSUES 25 n.1 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984).
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. J.D. Michigan Law
School 1989; B.S. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 1986. Many thanks to Dave Baldus, M.
Cherif Bassiouni, Jon Carlson, Michael Green, Nancy Jones, Ken Kress, Jordan Paust, John
Reitz, and Adrien Wing for comments on previous drafts; Garth Meintjes for encouragement
and perspective; Mary Keller and Jason Bremer for invaluable research assistance; and
Sandy Cosgrove and Steve Rhodes for support services. Any errors are my own.
1. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Time Has Come for an International Criminal Court, I
IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 33-34 (1991).
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American objections. These statutory sections include the Statute's
definitions of crimes, the role of the Prosecutor, the Court's anticipated
relationship with the U.N. Security Council, and the Court's anticipated
jurisdiction over states not party to the Statute. Part II selects three re-
cent or current instances where the United States has used armed force,
and analyzes the claims that might reasonably arise from the application
of the Statute's definitions of the relevant crimes. Part III assesses the
risks to the United States' interests arising from these claims.
In conformity with the developing ideals of interstate responsibility,
the uncertainty of the law and the nature of the attendant risks of prose-
cution are not of a quality that would foreclose U.S. participation in the
Criminal Court. When the U.S. acts pursuant to Security Council
authorization its nationals will be largely immune from prosecution in
the Criminal Court; accordingly, the U.S. may not legitimately chal-
lenge the Court on grounds that the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction
will conflict with either the United States' pre-existing duties under the
United Nations Charter or settled principles of international law. To the
extent that the U.S. officials or servicemen might indeed be forced to
defend against allegations of serious crimes, these U.S. officials or
servicemen will be most at risk when the U.S. is acting unilaterally, or
with respect to claims of aggression or war crimes violations in in-
stances where the scope of the reach of the applicable norm is not yet
settled.
INTRODUCTION
In 1625 Hugo Grotius put to paper the first comprehensive state-
ment of public international law, De Jure Belli ac Pacis.2 Considered by
many to be the "father of international law,"3 Grotius undertook the task
of proving the existence of the law of nations : he posited that "restraint
and decency could be grounded in law despite the realities of the new
age of statist diplomacy." 5 Grotius' work is well-recognized and his ide-
2. Although other scholars had previously addressed certain topics in international
law, Grotius' effort was the "first comprehensive and systematic treatise" in the field. Hersch
Lauterpact, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CON-
TEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 10 (Richard Falk et al. eds., 1985).
3. Introduction to INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 7. To which Hersch Lauter-
pact adds: "one of the greatest international figures of his age-a prodigy, almost a miracle
of learning." Lauterpact, supra note 2, at 10.
4. Lauterpact, supra note 2, at 12-13.
5. Richard Falk, The Grotian Quest, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 38; but
see B. Roling, Introduction to THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL 23 (C. Hosoye et al., eds.
1986) (asserting that Grotius' concept of just war "[c]lothed in elegant language and in-
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als have been incorporated into international relations; yet almost con-
sistently in the nearly 400 years which have elapsed since the
publication of De Jure Belli ac Pacis, a debate has raged over the le-
gitimacy of Grotius' exercise. The debate concerns the fundamental
principles of the discipline of international law: is there truly such a
thing as international law-that is to say a set of identifiable and en-
forceable imperatives? Or is that which is deemed "law" merely a
collection of moral suggestions that nations are free to adhere to or ig-
nore pursuant to nation-specific political, economic, and security
interests? 6 Crucial to the debate are instances of collective non-
enforcement of established norms. When powerful nations, focusing
only on the "bad action" of marginal, pariah, or enemy states, ignore
violations of other similarly situated states or the violations of their less-
powerful allies, the claim is made that nations are not governed by law
at all, but rather by the political interests of the most powerful states.
Many reject the strict law/politics dichotomy7 and recognize that the
international community is governed by a combination of the two
whereby the enforcement of normative imperatives is tempered by indi-
vidual political objectives.8 However this answer is unacceptable to
spired, it seemed, only by a yearning for justice.., in fact provided the state with the ration-
ale for starting any war it desired with a clear conscience").
6. In Henkin's view an overemphasis and misapprehension of the nature of state sov-
ereignty have hindered the normative development of international law. Arguing the
necessity of analyzing and "decomposing" the concept of sovereignty, Henkin posits that the
"essential characteristics and indicia of Statehood" are "independence, equality, autonomy,
'personhood,' territorial authority, integrity and inviolability, impermeability and 'privacy."'
Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Function, 216 RECEUIL DES COURs 24
(1989-IV), quoted in Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 15-16 (3d ed. 1993); cf
Introduction to INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 5 ("the primacy of the state, perceiv-
ing and acting on the basis of its particular interests (rather than on the basis of shared
interests or the public good), places very strong limits on what can be achieved by a 'law'
that transcends the particular.").
7. This debate is sometimes cast as a law/"power" dichotomy, where "power" denotes
"the ability of a State to impose its will on others or, more broadly, to control outcomes
contested by others." OSCAR SCHACTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 5
(1991). In this article I prefer the term "politics" which encompasses not only authority but
motive, and is thereby more precise.
8. As scholar Oscar Schacter posits:
Since we cannot deny the crucial role of power in the relations of States, we
should seek to understand its specific impact on the international legal system.
Plainly, international law is not an ideal construct, created and given effect solely
in terms of its internal logic. Nor can it be understood only as an instrument to
serve human needs and aims (though it is that too). International law must also be
seen as the product of historical experience in which power and the "relation of
forces" are determinants. Those states with power.., will have a disproportionate
and often decisive influence in determining the content of rules and their applica-
tion in practice. Because this is the case, international law, in a broad sense, both
reflects and sustains the existing political order and distribution of power.
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either camp in those instances where the stakes are highest-where the
perceived need for strict adherence to normative values and the per-
ceived need for sovereign flexibility are both at their peak: in times of
war. Under those circumstances the failure to adhere to accepted stan-
dards not only challenges certain central tenets of contemporary
international order, but may also cause human suffering on a massive
scale.9 Yet it is in those circumstances, where national security interests
Id. at 6. Schacter concludes, however, that the assumption that international law has no
meaning because powerful states often "flout" international law, is overly "simpl[istic]." Id.
By focusing on the "functions and significance" of international law instead of its
"violations," Schacter concludes that international law is a vital part of state behavior. Id. at
6-7.
9. It is no coincidence that the impetus for Grotius' work were the horrors of the Thirty
Year's War (1618-48), then in its tenth year:
Throughout the Christian world I observed a lack of restraint in relation to war,
such as even barbarous races should be ashamed of. I observed that men rush to
arms for slight causes or no causes at all, and that when arms have once been
taken up there is no longer any respect for law, divine or human; it is as if, in ac-
cordance with a general decree, frenzy had openly been let loose for the
committing of all crimes.
HUGO GROTIus, DE JURE BELLI Ac PACls LIBRI TRES 20 (Kelsey trans. 1913) (1625), quoted
in Mark W. Janis, The Utility of International Criminal Courts, 12 CONN. J. INT'L L. 161,
162 (1997); see also Falk, supra note 5, at 38 (describing the influence of the war on
Grotius). This legalistic and moralistic reaction to war ("never again") has been repeated
throughout the ages. The Peace at Westphalia, celebrated as the beginning of the modern
system of international law, followed the Thirty Years War, and promised a new age of in-
ternational cooperation. Id. Similarly, the years following the end of World War I (1914-18)
saw the formation of the League of Nations, the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact re-
nouncing war as an instrument of national policy, and the promulgation of several treaties
regarding the conduct of war and the treatment of captured soldiers. See generally LEAGUE
OF NATIONS COVENANT; see also Daniel Smith, The Struggle for an Enduring Peace, in
WOODROW WILSON AND THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE 3 (N. Gordon Levin, Jr. ed., 1972)
(describing the influence of World War I on American President Woodrow Wilson's com-
mitment to the League of Nations); Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of
National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, T.S. No. 796 [hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact]; Protocol for
the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous and other Gases, and of Bacte-
riological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T.S. 571; Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, June 19,
1931, 118 L.N.T.S. 303; see generally JOHN SPENCER BASSET, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS: A
CHAPTER IN WORLD POLITICS (1928); MANFRED LACHS, WAR CRIMES: AN ATTEMPT TO
DEFINE THE ISSUES 5-6 (1945) (listing major agreements about the conduct of warfare). The
United Nations was founded as a response to the horrors of World War II. See U.N. CHAR-
TER preamble (expressing determination to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of
war"). The post-war period also saw the promulgation of four Geneva Conventions related to
the conduct of war as well as treaties related to refugees and genocide. See Geneva Conven-
tion for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Con-
dition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949,
75 U.N.T.S. 8; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Convention Relating to the Status of Refu-
[Vol. 20:337
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are at stake-indeed, where national survival might be at stake-that
states are most likely to deviate from accepted norms of conduct.' ° For
these reasons, the moral suasion of the international law of war is often
presented as the litmus test of the validity of international law generally.
The vast body of law pertaining to warfare has several facets, in-
cluding acceptable justifications for the resort to armed force ("jus ad
bello"), as well as the conduct of war and the protection of civilians
during war (collectively, 'Jus in bello")." Closely affiliated with the law
gees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
10.
War... is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will .... Attached to
force are certain self-imposed, imperceptible limitations hardly worth mentioning,
known as international law and custom, but they scarcely weaken it .... To intro-
duce the principle of moderation into the theory of war itself would always lead to
logical absurdity.
CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR, quoted in Michael Howard, Temperamenta Belli: Can
War Be Controlled?, in RESTRAINTS ON WAR 1 (Michael Howard ed., 1979); see also TEL-
FORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 33 (1970) (describing
the tension between military necessity and humanitarian concerns as "the great dilemma" of
international law); PAUL CHRISTOPHER, THE ETHICS OF WAR 3 (1994) (describing inter arma
silent ledges as meaning "one can't reasonably expect to violate the rule of law in pursuit of
selfish interests and later seek protection under the law when those who were violated fought
back"); cf. Bryan Ranft, Restraints on War at Sea before 1945, in RESTRAINTS ON WAR,
supra, at 52-54 (noting Germany's abandonment of any restraint on attacking neutral ship-
ping in the latter stages of World War I and World War II when her position became more
vulnerable and defeat seemed likely.); but see Tami Davis Biddle, Air Power, in THE LAWS
OF WAR: CONSTRAINS ON WARFARE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 157 (Michael Howard et al.
eds., 1994) (suggesting U.S. national survival was not at stake when bombs were dropped on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki); KOSTA TsIPIs, ARSENAL: UNDERSTANDING WEAPONS IN THE Nu-
CLEAR AGE 25-27 (1983) (scientist's questioning of whether bombs were necessary).
11. See CHRISTOPHER, supra note 10, at 3 ("jus ad bello concerns the conditions that
make the use of war permissible and is primarily a political responsibility [while] jus in bello
concerns the rules governing how a war should be conducted and is largely a military re-
sponsibility").
The jus in bello itself has two principal subdivisions which are conventionally,
although not strictly accurately, categorized as 'Geneva', i.e. international hu-
manitarian, and 'Hague' law. 'Hague' law is primarily concerned with means,
methods and weaponry of warfare in contrast with the overtly 'humanitarian' con-
cerns of 'Geneva' law. These formal divisions are useful for purposes of
exposition and study and are broadly descriptive but are not to be taken as abso-
lutes.
HILARE MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: THE REGULATION OF ARMED
CONFLICTS 1-2 (1990). For a detailed discussion of the history of the development of jus in
bello and jus ad bello before the promulgation of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, see
Geoffrey Best, Restraints on War by Land before 1945, in RESTRAINTS ON WAR, supra note
10, at 17-37; RANFT, supra note 10, at 39-56; Donald C. Watt, Restraints on War in the Air
Before 1945, in RESTRAINTS ON WAR, supra note 10, at 57-77; see generally MCCOUBREY,
supra; THE LAWS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE IN THE WESTERN WORLD (Michael
Howard et al. eds. 1994) (describing development of the laws of war).
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of war is the prohibition of genocide.12 There is general consensus as to
the broad parameters of these norms: aggressive war is prohibited; 3
however, self-defense is permitted." Certain weapons, because of their
devastating physical effect, uncontrolled scope or environmental im-
12. The most comprehensive agreement pertaining to the crime of genocide is the
Genocide Convention, supra note 9. Genocide is a crime typically associated with war in
part because of the Holocaust's nexus to World War II and in part because of current exam-
ples of war waged for the purpose of excluding persons of certain ethnic and religious
identities from national territory. However, the definition of genocide, as well as past prac-
tice, demonstrates that genocide may occur in otherwise peaceful circumstances. Genocide is
defined in the Convention as:
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the Group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Genocide Convention, supra note 9, art. II. These violations are actionable "whether com-
mitted in time of peace or in time of war." Id. art I. Indeed, the fear that U.S. policies of
segregation would be deemed violative of these provisions was a prime justification for the
Senate's failure to approve ratification of the Convention until 1988, and then only with
numerous reservations and understandings. See U.S. Reservations and Understandings to the
Genocide Convention, CONG. REC. S1355-01 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986), reprinted in 28
I.L.M. 782 (1989); see generally NATALIE KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE
SENATE: A HISTORY OF OPPOSITION 37-63 (1990) (discussing Senate and other domestic
opposition to the Genocide Convention); JORDAN PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 1104-12 (collecting materials explicating U.S. legislators'
objections to the Genocide Convention, and the eventual reservations). Other examples of
possible peacetime violations of the Genocide Convention include the U.S. government-
sponsored experiments in Tuskegee, Alabama, during which doctors withheld diagnosis and
treatment of syphilis from poor black patients as part of a medical experiment, and various
South African Apartheid policies, including the removal of fair-complected children from
darker parents and placing the former with persons of similar skin tone. See generally JAMES
H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT (1981) (describing experiment
and arguments that it constituted genocide); JOHN DUGARD, UPDATE SOUTH AFRICA: TIME
RUNNING OUT (1992) (describing policies of Apartheid).
13. See, e.g., Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 9 (eschewing war as an instrument of na-
tional policy in favor of "peaceful and orderly process"); Resolution on the Definition of
Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N, GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1975) (calling upon states to renounce aggression, defined as including "the use of
armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence
of another State"); U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 (calling upon Member states to refrain from
the use or threatened use of force in international relations). See generally PAUST, supra note
12, at 861-966 (collecting materials explicating the development of the law regarding crimes
against peace).
14. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of an individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member
of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security.").
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pact, are not to be used." Opposing forces, once captured, are guaran-
teed minimum standards of safety and comfort. 16 Civilians are to be
protected from undue harm, and the targeting of specific segments of a
population for annihilation or exclusion is prohibited. 7 A poll of the
heads of national governments would elicit statements in agreement
15. Beginning in the nineteenth century and continuing today, modem rules have been
developed setting limits on the acceptable methods of warfare. Over time more modem
weaponry, including long-range explosives, toxic and aerial weapons, and later, atomic,
nuclear and biological weapons, were developed; as these weapons radically altered the
nature of battles, conventions were adapted or adopted to respond to those changes. See
YVONNE VAN DONGEN, THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN POPULATIONS IN TIME OF ARMED
CONFLICT 21 (1991) ("The means of destruction had become far more numerous than ever
before; therefore, the need for more precise ideas on limitations became urgent."); see also
post-World War II treaties cited supra note 9. The environmental impact of these weapons,
as well as the environmental damage associated with conventional warfare has been the
subject of international agreements since the 1970s. See, e.g., Convention on the Prohibition
of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, Dec. 10,
1976, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151; Protocol Additional (No. I) to the Geneva Conventions of August
12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June
18, 1977, art. 55, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol No. I] ("Care shall be taken in war-
fare to protect the natural environment against wide-spread, long-term and severe damage.").
16. Nations promulgated both domestic codes and international rules relating to the
treatment of enemy soldiers, both on the field of battle and upon capture or death. See VAN
DONGEN, supra note 15, at 22 ("Between 1581 and 1864, up to 294 treaties for the ameliori-
zation of wounded soldiers had been concluded between European governments."). Perhaps
the most famous of these early efforts was the U.S. War Department's "Instructions for the
Government of Armies of the United States in the Field," the so-called "Leiber Code" or
"Field Code," written by Francis Leiber and promulgated by President Abraham Lincoln in
1863. See TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 21.
17. Humanitarian protections intended to minimize harm to civilians have become an
increasingly important focus of the international community in the twentieth century. Such
humanitarian provisions were included in the Hague Convention of 1907, which prohibited
"[t]he attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings
which are undefended." Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
and its Annex: Regulation Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, art. 25, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3) 461, 187 Consol. T.S. 227 (entered into
force Jan. 26, 1910). That convention also required combatants to take "all necessary
steps.., to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charita-
ble purposes, historic monuments [and] hospitals" not then being used for military purposes.
Id. art. 27; see also id. art. 26 (requiring commanding officers to "do all in his power" to
alert the relevant authorities before commencing a bombardment that is not an assault); id.
art. 28 ("The pillage of a town or place, even when taken by assault, is prohibited."). Since
the end of World War 11 the treatment of civilians in both international and internal conflicts
has remained a high priority. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol No. I, supra note
15; Protocol Additional (No. II) to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609; Resolution of the Basic Principles for the Protection of Civilian Populations in
Armed Conflicts, G.A. Res. 2675, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 76, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1970). See generally PAUST, supra note 12, at 1027-1113 (collecting materials
explicating crimes against humanity and genocide).
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with these principles' 8-albeit subject to wildly varying interpretations
of their application." Notwithstanding this stated commitment to the
18. Evidence of national consensus can be gleaned from a variety of sources, including
the high levels of state participation in these agreements, wide-spread support for certain
U.N. General Assembly resolutions and Security Council resolutions in response to particu-
lar crises.
19. See EUGENE DAVIDSON, THE NUREMBERG-FALLACY: WARS AND WAR CRIMES SINCE
WORLD WAR II 16 (1973) (noting that "aggression, as such, remains universally condemned
even if the powers are seldom agreed on when it occurs"). Perhaps the most significant in-
terpretative questions arise from justifications of self-defense. For example, since 1980 the
United States has resorted to armed force on numerous occasions, including military action
in Grenada (1983, defense of nationals), Libya (1986, to deter terrorism), Panama (1989, in
response to declaration of "war" by Noriega), in support of contras in Nicaragua (1981-86,
collective self-defense), Iraq (collective self-defense), and most recently, the targeting of
missiles at targets in Sudan and Afghanistan (1998, to deter terrorism). In each instance
American officials relied on some variant of individual or collective self-defense as justifi-
cation for its military action. See Patrick Kelly, Congressmen Question U.S. Presence in
Grenada, U.P.I., Oct. 26, 1983, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File (citing Pres.
Ronald Reagan as defending the invasion as necessary to save the lives of 1,000 Americans
located in Grenada at the time of a coup); Noriega in Hiding: 12 Americans Die as U.S.
Troops Topple Regime, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1989, at Al (quoting Pres. George Bush as
arguing that Noriega had created "an imminent danger" to American citizens living in Pan-
ama); World Court: U.S. Aid to Contras Illegal, CHI. TRIB., June 28, 1986, at 1-2
(describing World Court judgment rejecting American arguments that intervention in Nica-
ragua was justifiable collective self-defense); Missed Signals in the Middle East, WASH.
POST MAG., Mar. 17, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers File (quoting the U.S.
State Department spokesman as affirming U.S. commitment to "collective self-defense");
Excerpts from Clinton's White House Statement Yesterday, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 21,
1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers File (quoting Pres. Clinton, in response to
the bombings of Sudan and Afghanistan, as promising that Americans would defend "our
people, our interest and our values"). One scholar asserts that "the need to identify the en-
emy as the aggressor is not new" and notes that the cloak of self-defense was regularly
assumed by ancient Roman leaders. DAVIDSON, supra note 19, at 9-10. However, that justi-
fication was rejected by many notable international scholars in the majority of the above-
noted cases, and in some instances by the international community. See, e.g., Christopher
Joyner, The United States Action in Greneda: Reflections on the Lawfulness of Invasion, 78
AM. J. INT'L L. 131, 133 (1984) ("Did the United States have the lawful right to intervene
militarily, alone or in concert, into the domestic political affairs of Greneda? Upon close
inspection, one must strain hard to find satisfactory or even acceptable justification under
international law for the U.S. action."); Oscar Schacter, International Law: The Right of
States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620 (1984) (concluding there was, at best,
justification for rescue efforts); Ved Nanda, U.S. Forces in Panama: Defenders, Aggressors
or Human Rights Activists?: The Validity of United States Intervention in Panama under
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 494 (1990) (concluding self-defense argument invalid
in Panama); but see Anthony D'Amato, The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to
Tyranny, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 516 (1990) (arguing that positive implications for human rights
would result from the American Invasion). The notable exception is the Gulf War of 1991-
which, not coincidentally was the only instance in which the U.S. sought prior approval of
the U.N. Security Council. See S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990). Although pun-
dits, scholars, and national leaders alike have questioned the motives of the U.S.
administration's 1990-91 actions in the Gulf, the method of military engagement in 1991
and the United States' continuing resort to military force, few question the legal sufficiency
of the original invocation of collective self-defense.
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norms of international peace and security, the years since the founding
of the U.N. have seen recourse to armed force on innumerable occa-
sions.2 States freely utilize armed force when they believe that the use
of force advances national interests and that the rest of the international
community will either be indifferent to their use of force or collectively
unable to respond.' Indeed, this ambivalence towards the appropriate-
ness of the resort to armed force is incorporated into the very fabric of
the U.N., which entrusts security interests to the Security Council, a po-
litical body largely subject to the whims of its five permanent members
(the "P5").22 As a result of the individual political interests of the P5
during the Cold War period of Security Council dormancy, innumerable
instances implicating international peace and security went unaddressed
by the Council because of the potential impact on individual geo-
political interests. Yet this seeming indifference is contrary to the legacy
that serves as a basis for the United Nations.
20. Justifications have included self-defense, self-determination, defense of democracy,
combating of terrorism and drug trafficking, and restoration or protection of a recognized
national government.
21. This ambivalent commitment to the tenets of international peace has recently been
compounded by an equivocal judgment by the International Court of Justice which has left
open to states the possibility of resort to nuclear weapons "in an extreme circumstance of
self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake." Advisory Opinion on
the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 36 (July 8), reprinted in
35 I.L.M. 809, 831 (1996) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons]; see also Richard Falk, The Nu-
clear Weapons Advisory Opinion and the New Jurisprudence of Global Civil Society, 7
TRANSNAT'L. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 333, 350 (1997) (noting that although the ICJ opinion
gave "definite encouragement" to the campaign to "rid the world of nuclear weaponry," the
opinion may also "reinforc[e] cynical views that international law is of marginal relevance
with respect to the shaping of national policy in matters of peace and security, especially
when the constraints of law challenge major geopolitical positions").
22. The five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, sometimes referred to as
the "P5," are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and United States. U.N. CHARTER
art. 23, para. 1. Because Security Council action taken in response to threatened or actual
breach of international peace and security requires the agreement of the PS, each exercises
"veto power" with regard to these important measures. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 26, paras. 2-
3; see generally THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 447-55 (Bruno
Simma et al. eds., 1994) (describing the operation of the Security Council). From the begin-
nings of its operations the Council has been subject to the pressures of geopolitics, most
notably the Cold War. See id. (discussing Council stalemate and the ascendancy of the Gen-
eral Assembly during that period). Even in this post-Cold War age of cooperation Security
Council action is viewed as primarily political in nature. See Order with Regard to Request
for the Indication of Provisional Measures in the Case Concerning Questions of Interpreta-
tion and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at
Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114 (Apr. 14), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 662, 665 (1992)
[hereinafter Montreal Convention on Lockerbie] (dissenting opinion of Judge Bedjaoui)
(distinguishing between political solutions promulgated by the Security Council and legal
determinations of the International Court of Justice).
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PART I-FORMULATION OF STANDARDS FOR THE VINDICATION OF
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
The Nuremberg Legacy
There have been moments when the international community has
exercised its political will to condemn actors for violating essential
norms pertaining to the waging of war. The most significant and most
successful effort was the establishment of the Nuremberg Tribunal fol-
lowing World War II, in which members of the Nazi command structure
were held individually accountable for crimes against peace, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity.23 As a result of the trials in Nur-
emberg nineteen German military and political leaders were found
guilty for their actions in waging and pursuing the war.' Similar judg-
23. See Agreement by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, The Government of the United States of America, The Provisional Gov-
ernment of the French Republic, and the Government of the Soviet Socialist Republics for
the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis and
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Mar. 15, 1951, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (1945)
[hereinafter Nuremberg Charter]. The Nuremberg Charter defined these crimes as:
CRIMES AGAINST PEACE: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a
war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or as-
surances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment
of any of the foregoing;
WAR CRIMES: namely, violation of the laws or customs of war. Such violations
shall include ... murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any
other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-
treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder
of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity;
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, de-
portation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population,
before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds
in execution of or in connection with any crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tri-
bunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated.
Id. art. 6; cf TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 81-82 (describing the history of war crimes tribu-
nals); Bryan MacPherson, Building an International Criminal Court for the 21st Century, 13
CONN. J. INT'L. L. 1, 3-10 (1998). Nuremberg is wrongly remembered as the first effort to
try purported war criminals. There are actually numerous prior examples of war crimes trials,
including a concerted effort to try German officers for illegal conduct taken during World
War I. See generally JAMES WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: THE POLITICS AND DIPLO-
MACY OF PUNISHING WAR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR (1982).
24. See ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE N0RNBERG CASE xii-xiii (1971). Three defendants
were acquitted of all charges. The trial, prosecuted by counsel representing the four Allied
superpowers, lasted 216 days, and included testimony of thirty-three witnesses for the prose-
cution and innumerable documents. Of the nineteen convicted, twelve were sentenced to
death, three to life imprisonment, and the remainder for lesser prison terms. See id. In addi-
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ments were handed down against high-ranking Japanese officials during
the less well-known Tokyo Tribunal.2 ' The relentless pursuit of World
War II war criminals continues to this day;26 these past and present ef-
forts have played an important role in advancing the normative
development of the international law of war and genocide and have
contributed to a popular cultural understanding of the risks and appro-
priate limits on the conduct of war. As a result, in the wake of more
recent conflicts, there has been significant popular and international
support for the establishment of war crimes tribunals, leading to the
U.N. Security Council's establishment of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("Yugoslavia Tribunal") and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("Rwanda Tribunal").
tion, the Allied superpowers held war crimes proceedings in their various spheres of control,
trying over 20,000 defendants on war crimes charges. See MacPherson, supra note 23, at 8-
9.
25. See Douglas MacArthur, Special Proclamation: Establishment of an International
Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, 4 Bevans 20 (1968) (proclamation by the
occupation chief, Douglas MacArthur, establishing the International Military Tribunal for
the Far East, an extension of the Nuremberg Charter); see generally Preface, in THE TOKYO
WAR CRIMES TRIAL, supra note 5, at 7-10 (describing the Tokyo trials and results).
26. See Principles of International Co-operation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition
and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res.
3074, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 78, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974). Spearheaded
by the life-long efforts of the self-proclaimed "Nazi hunters" worldwide, Nazis who success-
fully obtained refuge in the Americas and elsewhere have been exposed and, in some
instances, returned to Europe or Israel for trial. See, e.g., Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d
571 (6th Cir. 1985) (affirming extradition order releasing a former Ukranian national to
stand trial for crimes against humanity in Israel). Indeed, resorting to methods of self-help,
Israel employed kidnapping to secure jurisdiction over Holocaust mastermind Adolph Eich-
man. See PETER PAPADATOS, THE EICHMAN TRIAL 53-62 (1964) (describing kidnapping,
international reaction to kidnapping, and legal consequences arising therefrom under inter-
national and Israeli domestic law). In connection with recent trials of suspected Nazi
collaborators, international debates have arisen about the appropriateness of conducting
trials of this nature some fifty years after the fact. See, e.g., Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 110
F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1993) (determining that government lawyers pressing for extradition of
Demjanjuk had perpetrated a fraud upon the court by withholding evidence highlighting the
flaws of the identification witnesses relied upon); see generally YORAM SHEFTEL, THE DEM-
JANJUK AFFAIR (1994) (defense counsel's conclusion that the Israeli justice system was
purposefully subverted in an effort to make a political and moral statement). Others continue
to press for trials, both as part of a modern push for international remembrance, justice, and
deterrence, and as recognition of the shared guilt of collaborators or those who acquiesced.
See, e.g., DAVID MATAS, JUSTICE DELAYED: NAZI WAR CRIMINALS IN CANADA 259 (1988)
(citing "[t]he urgent need to deal with Nazi war criminals living in Canada"); SIMON WIE-
SENTHAL, THE MURDERERS AMONG Us (Joseph Wechsberg ed., 1967) (chronicling the long-
standing commitment of Wiesenthal, the "Eichmann-hunter" to bring Nazi war criminals to
justice; Wiesenthal set up several centers which to this day collect information on Nazi war
crimes); see generally MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW
294 (1997) (discussing the procedural and fairness issues connected with criminal prosecu-
tions of this type and concluding that, with appropriate safeguards, such prosecutions may be
compatible with the goals of "cultivating liberal memory and solidarity").
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These ad hoc tribunals have jurisdiction to investigate possible war
crimes committed by Bosnian Serb, Muslim, and Croatian forces in the
former Yugoslavia and the crime of genocide in Rwanda.27
Though significant, each of these previous efforts to assign criminal
liability for violations of the law of war both jus ad bello and jus in
bello has been deemed insufficient, primarily due to their dependence
on ad hoc arrangements. The Nuremberg Tribunal and its progeny have
long been denounced by some as an example of "victors' justice. 28 Al-
though the principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal were later affirmed by
the General Assembly,29 the Tribunal was a creation of the victorious
Allied superpowers. 0 Allied conduct during the war was never sub-
jected to international scrutiny for conformance with established
standards of jus in bello. Accordingly, even though the controversial
27. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) (establishing an "International Tri-
bunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia" since 1991); Stat-
ute of the International Tribunal (For the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia), U.N.
Doc. S/25704 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993); S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (1994) (establishing the "International Tribunal for Rwanda"); see generally
MacPherson, supra note 23, at 13-14 (describing the impetus which led to the creation of the
"far superior" Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals); but see Makau Mutua, Never Again:
Questioning the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals, II TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 167 (1997)
(opining that absent the outrage and sympathy of the public, inspired by graphic media cov-
erage, there would have been insufficient political will at the Security Council to create the
tribunals).
28. Robert Jackson, Chief U.S. Prosecutor at the Nuremberg Tribunal, in his opening
statement at the proceedings, acknowledged that "the nature of these crimes is such that both
prosecution and judgment must be by the victor nations over vanquished foes .... Either the
victors must judge the vanquished or we must leave the defeated to judge themselves." JACK-
SON, supra note 24, at 33; see also DAVIDSON, supra note 19, at 285 ("The trials were fatally
flawed from the beginning, from before the beginning; they were trials of the vanquished
brought before the courts of the victors."); Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1949)
(concluding that Tokyo Tribunal "did not ... sit as a judicial tribunal," but rather "solely [as]
an instrument of political power"); cf TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 81-84 (questioning the
legality of some of the crimes listed in the indictment as valid principles of international
law); J.H. MORGAN, THE GREAT ASSIZE 19 (1948) (same).
One might argue that the true test of the legitimacy of the war crimes tribunals following
World War II as principled application of law and not "victors' justice" would be the will-
ingness of the Allied superpowers to submit to being judged by the same standards, or, to
paraphrase Justice Jackson, what happens when "we leave the victors to judge themselves?"
Many would argue that the Nuremberg Charter fails to pass the test of universal application.
See generally TAYLOR, supra note 10 (arguing that the U.S. committed war crimes in Viet-
nam).
29. See Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of
Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., at 1144, U.N. Doc. A/236 (1946).
30. Notably, only Americans, Britons, French, and Russians sat as judges on the Tribu-
nal; a broader international panel judged the Tokyo trials. See Preface to THE TOKYO WAR
CRIMES TRIAL, supra note 5, at 7 (describing the national composition of the panels).
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and devastating fire-bombing of Dresden," the catastrophic bombing of
Tokyo, and the use of atomic weapons on the civilian population centers
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 2 arguably fell within the Allied definition of
war crimes-the "wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity" 33 -the Allies determined
by fiat not only the definition of war crimes, but also the scope of the
prosecution.?
Fifty years after this disquieting beginning, the new ad hoc interna-
tional war crimes tribunals investigating possible violations in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Rwanda were established. These most recent examples
would seem to escape the criticism of victor's justice, since the tribunals
were established by nations uninvolved in the principal dispute.3" How-
ever, viewed against the history of the preceding fifty years, the creation
of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals highlights other concerns about
the ad hoc appointment of criminal tribunals: that they produce uneven
justice, unequal justice, and politicized justice.
The complaint of uneven justice speaks to the problems of selectiv-
ity. Since the Nuremberg trials concluded, supposedly ringing in a new
31. See Biddle, supra note 10, at 140, 154 (describing fire-bombing).
32. For a description of the loss of life, physical and psychological injuries, and societal
damage which resulted from the bombings, see HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI: THE PHYSICAL,
MEDICAL AND SOCIAL EFFECTS OF THE ATOMIC BOMBINGS (Eisei Ishikawa et al. trans., 1981)
(report authored by the Commission for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by
the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki). It is difficult to quantify the overall fatalities
of the bombings, since long-term mortality rates were also affected by the exposure to radia-
tion. See id. at 237-43. Early figures put the number of civilian casualties at 118,661 and
73,884, respectively. See id. at 113-14 (providing statistics of Hiroshima fatalities as of
August, 10, 1946; Nagasaki fatalities as of Dec. 31, 1945).
33. See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 23, art. 6 (providing a definition of "war
crimes").
34. By the terms of its Charter, the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal was limited
to "German atrocities in Occupied Europe" committed by "German officers and men and
members of the Nazi Party." Id. preamble; see also id. art. 6 (referring to the trial and pun-
ishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis countries"); cf Proclamation, supra
note 25 (establishing Tokyo Tribunal to review crimes by Japanese political and military
leaders); Onuma Yasuaki, The Tokyo Trial: Between Law and Politics, in THE TOKYO WAR
CRIMES TRIAL, supra note 5, at 45-46 (discussing the failure of the Tribunal to address the
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and concluding this "unfairness" contributed to Japa-
nese cynicism about the trial).
35. It must be acknowledged that the members of the Security Council do have political
and strategic interests which may be furthered by the decisions of the Yugoslavia and
Rwanda tribunals. Indeed, Serbian leaders have complained that the investigation of possible
war crimes and the conduct of the Yugoslavia Tribunal has been tainted by a pro-West, anti-
Serbian agenda. See, e.g., Dean Murphy, NATO's Image among Bosnian Serbs Darkens,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1996 at A4 (describing negative reaction of Bosnian Serbs to the arrest
of two indicted officers).
Winter 1999)
Michigan Journal of International Law
world order characterized by world peace and respect for human rights,36
it is estimated that over 250 instances of armed force have occurred,
including both open invasions and covert operations.37 In addition to war
crimes and crimes against peace, genocidal campaigns during this era
caused the loss of millions of lives in Tibet, Cambodia, Guatemala, Bu-
rundi, Indonesia, Paraguay, and within the Soviet Union.3" Yet the
international community lacked the political will to address these grave
violations of international law. 39 As a result, and however just or
"unjustly,"" many criticize efforts to bring those guilty of war crimes to
justice as motivated by "political considerations ... rather than any ob-
jective analysis of their usefulness in promoting justice."' The concern
is not for those brought to trial; rather, the lack of political will to install
war crimes tribunals in such circumstances is seen by some as a reflec-
tion of the international devaluation of some victims on racial, political,
or other grounds. In addition, selectivity of this type undermines any
36. See, e.g., Henry King, Jr., The Meaning of Nuremberg, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
143, 147 (1998) (detailing the lessons of Nuremberg including the lessons that "wanton
aggression cannot be permitted" and the importance of recognizing individual rights).
37. See generally DAVIDSON, supra note 19 (detailing major instances of armed force
occurring between 1945 and 1973).
38. See Barbara Harff, Recognizing Genocides and Politicides, in GENOCIDE WATCH
27, 31-36 tbl. 31 (Helen Fein ed., 1992) (collecting incidences of genocide and politicide
since World War II); GENOCIDE AND DEMOCRACY IN CAMBODIA (Ben Kiernan ed., 1993)
(describing genocide and its political and legal implications); cf Kurt Jonassohn, What is
Genocide?, in GENOCIDE WATCH, supra, at 17 (arguing that deficiencies in the Genocide
Convention's definition of genocide render it inadequate because it fails to cover important
instances of genocide which have occurred since its entry into force).
39. Perhaps most ironic is the international community's belated denunciation of Iraq's
President Saddam Hussein as a "Hitler." See David Hoffman, George Bush: The Statesman,
the Pol and War, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 1990, at CI-C2 (quoting Bush as declaring Saddam
Hussein to be a "dictator 'worse than Hitler' "). Yet in 1988, when news reports publicized
Hussein's use of chemical weapons against northern villages populated by the Kurdish mi-
nority, the international reaction was muted. See David Little, Speech: Protecting Human
Rights During and After Conflict: The Role of The United Nations, 4 TULSA J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 87, 89 (1996) (noting there was "hardly a squeak from the UN" in response to that
and other humanitarian violations).
40. Statement by the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan at the Ceremony
Held at Campidoglio Celebrating the Adoption of the Statute of the International Criminal
Court (18 July, 1998) (visited Aug. I1, 1998) <http://www.un.org/icc/speeches/718sg.htm>
(accusations that victor's justice prevails and not international law are made "however un-
justly, when courts are set up only ad hoc").
41. MacPherson, supra note 23, at 26; cf Payam Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, Peace
in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal, 20
HUM. RTS. Q. 738, 765-95 (1998) (former prosecutor describes the concededly difficult, but
genuine quest for "truth" in the former Yugoslavia); but see Mutua, supra note 27 (providing
a devastating assessment of the political and legal limitations on the Nuremberg, Tokyo,
Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals).
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deterrence effect which consistent, universal, and rigorous prosecution
might have on preventing future violations. 2
A complaint closely linked to that of unevenness is that of inequal-
ity. The complaint of inequality is reminiscent of the complaint of
"victors' justice" and is distinguished from the concerns of uneveness in
that inequality focuses on the ability of powerful nations to avoid sub-
jecting their own actions to international scrutiny. 4 This is particularly
true to the extent that ad hoc tribunals are dependant upon the Security
Council for their mandate; the judicious use of the veto power held by
the permanent members has prevented the U.N. from effectively re-
sponding to any acts of aggression committed by the permanent
members or their close allies.'
Finally, the recent example of the Yugoslavia Tribunal exemplifies
a new concern: the influence of politics on the decision to prosecute in-
dividuals for war crimes violations and crimes against humanity.
Considered directly responsible for many of the atrocities committed by
their forces, the indicted Bosnian Serb leaders, Radovan Karadzic and
General Ratko Mladic,45 negotiated practical, if not legal, immunity
from prosecution as a condition to the peace accords.46 While the new
Bosnian government committed itself to cooperate with the Yugoslavia
41Tribunal's efforts to investigate and prosecute war crimes, the gov-
ernment has refused to surrender them for trial, and NATO forces have
been reluctant to apprehend them.48 It has long been acknowledged that
42. See MacPherson, supra note 23, at 24.
43. See id. at 18.
44. See generally DAVIDSON, supra note 19.
45. Both have been indicted by the Yugoslav Tribunal for actions taken during the War.
See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: International Arrest War-
rants and Orders for Surrender for Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, July 11, 1996, 36
I.L.M. 92 (1997).
46. There is nothing startling or unusual about this proposition:
The grim reality is that in order to obtain peace, negotiations must be held with the
very leaders who frequently are the ones who committed, ordered or allowed ter-
rible crimes to be committed. Thus, the choice presented to negotiators is whether
to have peace or justice. Sometimes this dichotomy is presented along more so-
phisticated lines: peace now, and justice some other time. The choice is, however,
frequently fallacious and the dichotomy may be tragically deceptive.
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountabil-
ity, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 12 (1996).
47. See General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Annexes, art. IX,
35 I.L.M. 75, 118 (1996) ("The Parties shall cooperate fully.., in the investigation and
prosecution of war crimes, and other violations of international humanitarian law."); see also
id. at 118, Annex 4; BOSN. & HERZ. CONST. art II, § 8 (requiring cooperation).
48. See Ray Mosley, War Criminals May Go Free: NATO Not Expected to Pursue Bos-
nia Suspects, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 31, 1995, at Al. One year after the peace accords Chief
Prosecutor Richard Goldstone identified the arrest of the indictees living in the former
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an independent permanent structure is required to address these and
other concerns."
The International Criminal Court
Many of these concerns were recognized soon after the conclusion
of the Nuremberg Tribunal. Soon after the U.N.'s founding, the United
Nations General Assembly commissioned the U.N.'s International Law
Commission with the task of considering how best to permanently ad-
dress "Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind."5 ° Based on
the Commission's findings, the General Assembly next established a
Committee to consider the establishment of a standing international
criminal court, the Committee on International Criminal Justice.5" The
Committee's immediate efforts resulted in the promulgation of a draft
Court statute in 1951, as revised in 1953;52 however, Cold-War politics
and other international pressures, which often undermined the effective-
ness of the U.N. from the mid-fifties to the mid-eighties, effectively
terminated the efforts of the General Assembly to further develop plans
for a standing international court with criminal competence.
Yugoslavia as "the most important problem still facing the Yugoslav Tribunal." Justice
Richard Goldstone, Conference Lunch Address, 7 TRANSNAT'L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 7
(1997); see also Akhavan, supra note 41, at 795-813 (calling for the international commu-
nity to "make the sacrifices necessary to arrest indicted persons" and discussing several
policy changes that might result in arrests). Later orders committed NATO forces to arresting
war criminals, but notwithstanding that policy arrests of Karadzic and Mladic seem unlikely;
but see Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 462, 463 (1998)
(asserting that the arrest of these and other principle figures "remains a distinct possibility");
see also Steven Erlanger, Bosnian Serb General is Arrested by Allied Force in Genocide
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1998, at Al (describing arrest of Maj. Gen. Radislav Krstic, high-
est-ranking official arrested to date and allegedly involved in 1995 Srebrenica massacre).
The recent detention of former Chilean leader Augusto Pinochet in London for possible
extradition to Spain on charges amounting to crimes against humanity might indicate other
means of effecting the arrest of Karadzic, Mladic and others. See Ray Moseley, British Lords
to Try Again on Pinochet, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 16, 1999, at A4 (describing proceedings convened
to review the extradition request).
49. The urgency is no different now than it was before the creation of the Yugoslavia
and Rwanda Tribunals. Because of financial and political costs, some believe that it is un-
likely that the Security Council will soon resort to such an ad hoc arrangement again. See
Jelena Pejic, Creating a Permanent International Criminal Court: The Obstacles to Inde-
pendence and Effectiveness, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV 291, 293 (1998) (citing Security
Council "fatigue"); cf. Mutua, supra note 27, at 174 (arguing that the Council never had any
independent desire to create the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals, and that it did so only
because of popular pressure incited by media coverage).
50. See G.A. Res. 260, U.N. GAOR, 3d. Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); see also
MacPherson, supra note 23, at 11; M. Cherif Bassiouni, Establishment of a Permanent ICC,
Historical Survey: 1919-1998, in III INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (on file with author).
51. See G.A. Res. 489, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950);
see also MacPherson, supra note 23, at 11.
52. See MacPherson, supra note 23, at 11.
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In 1989 the work of the Commission in drafting a statute began
anew.53 At the same time, with the easing of the Cold War and the dis-
integration of the Soviet Union came the chaos resulting from the
disintegration of the Yugoslavian Republic. The probable war crimes
committed during that conflict and others, 4 spurred renewed interest in
the creation of a criminal court.55 A new draft statute was produced in
1993, which eventually led to the creation by the General Assembly in
1995 of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an Interna-
tional Criminal Court ("Preparatory Committee").56 The ultimate goal of
the Preparatory Committee was to develop a draft that would serve as a
basis for a convention to be considered during a diplomatic confer-
ence.57 Approval for the conference was forthcoming, and soon after the
conclusion of the eighth session of the Preparatory Committee in April
1998,58 a five-week conference was convened in Rome to consider the
53. See id. at 14.
54. In the wake of the 1990 Gulf War, calls were made for criminal charges to be levied
against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, including crimes of aggression and charges relating
to his treatment of foreign citizens and crimes against the environment. See, e.g., United
States Department of Defense Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War-
Appendix on the Role of the Law of War, Apr. 10, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 612, 644 (1992)
[hereinafter DOD Iraq Report] (alleging various war crimes violations by Iraq and calling for
a strategy to punish Iraq for them); Louis Beres, Prosecuting Iraqi Gulf War Crimes: Allied
and Israeli Rights under International Low, 16 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 41, 65
(1992) (arguing that America and Israel have the "legal and moral" basis to prosecute Iraq
for "Nuremberg-type" crimes committed by Iraq).
55. During the interim period between 1953 and the 1990s, some nations did pursue the
idea of an international criminal court to respond to the problems of international drug traf-
ficking. See MacPherson supra note 23, at 12-13. Moreover, as a response to the increased
problems of international terrorism and, in particular, terrorism aimed at civilian aircraft, a
variety of international agreements address international cooperation in apprehending and
bringing to justice perpetrators of such acts. See, e.g., Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation signed at Montreal on 23 September
1971,24 U.S.T. 567.
56. See MacPherson, supra note 23, at 14; Christopher Keith Hall, The First Two Ses-
sion of the U.N. Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, 91 AM. J. INT'L. L. 177 (1997).
57. See MacPherson, supra note 23, at 14; Hall, supra note 56, at 177-78; Garth
Meintjes, Introduction to Symposium: Prosecuting International Crimes: an Inside View, 7
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. i (1997) (describing recent history). In this intensive
drafting phase the Preparatory Committee was authorized to receive the input of non-
governmental organizations, NGO, played a significant role in the Committee's sessions and
at the eventual diplomatic conference.
58. For reports on the work accomplished during the first five sessions of the Prepara-
tory Committee, see generally Hall, supra note 56; Christopher Keith Hall, The Third and
Fourth Sessions of the U.N. Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, 92 AM. J. INT'L. L. 124 (1998); Christopher Keith Hall, The Fifth Session of
the U.N. Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,
92 AM. J. INT'L L. 331 (1998); NOVELLES ETUDES PtNALES: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: OBSERVATIONS AND ISSUES BEFORE THE 1997-98 PREPARATORY COMMITTEE (1999)
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draft statute. 9 On July 17, 1998, the final day of the conference, the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted by an
overwhelming majority of the nations participating in the conference: 6°
the Statute earned the support of 120 nations, with seven states voting
against the Statute, and twenty-one states abstaining.6'
At the request of the United States, the vote was non-recorded;
62
however, the U.S. State Department has acknowledged its opposition to
the Statute.63 Those familiar with past American positions on submitting
its actions to the scrutiny of international tribunals6' and its past privi-
leging of American national security interests65 will find the U.S.
position disappointing, but not surprising. What are the perceived and
actual risks to American interests if the Rome Statute, as most predict,
is ratified by the requisite number of states and the Criminal Court be-
gins operations?
The United States' Objections
In a press briefing soon after the conclusion of the Rome Confer-
ence, U.S. Department of State representative James Rubin denounced
the Rome Statute as "deeply flawed" and certain to "produce a flawed
court," which would further be "weakened" without the participation of
the United States-"the leading force for the rule of law and the leading
(describing sessions, draft statute and identifying outstanding legal issues). In addition to the
important legal questions raised, the creation of the complex judicial and investigatory
structure anticipated by the Rome Statute also requires a searching examination of logistical
and financial considerations. For an example of some of those calculations, see Thomas
Warrick, Organization of the International Criminal Court: Administrative and Financial
Issues, 25 DENV. J. INT'L L & POL'Y 333 (1997).
59. See G.A. Res. 52/160, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/160 (1997) (calling for conference); see
also U.N. Press Release (July 17, 1998), available in <http://www.un.org/icc/pressrel/
summary.htm>; Bassiouni, supra note 50.
60. See U.N. Press Release, supra note 59.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing (July 20, 1998), available in
<http://secretary.state.gov./www/briefings, )807/980720odb.html> [hereinafter July 20 Press
Briefing]; see also David Scheffer, America's Stake in Peace, Security and Justice, AM. Soc.
INT'L L. NEWSL., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 1 (comments by U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War
Crimes Issues critiquing the Rome Statute as flawed).
64. For a useful discussion of measures the United States took first to avoid and later to
ignore the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, see BARRY CARTER & PHILLIP
TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 310-26 (2d ed. 1995) (describing U.S. actions with regard to
litigation with Nicaragua).
65. In the past two years, during the international crises stemming from Iraq's refusal to
cooperate with U.N. weapons inspections efforts, the Administration has indicated increasing
willingness to use military force in response-even in the face of concerted international
disagreement.
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force... in the fight against war crimes and crimes against humanity. '
Denouncing the motives and understanding of the drafters,67 Rubin
identified a few "basic" yet critical flaws68 that would prevent the U.S.
from participating in the proposed court.69 First, the U.S. complained
about the overly broad scope of the crimes covered, including the an-
ticipated inclusion of the crime of aggression, the possible (albeit more
remote) inclusion of the use of nuclear weapons as a crime, and the re-
fusal to permit reservations.70  Second, the U.S. objected to the
66. See July 20 Press Briefing, supra note 63.
67. Rubin described the conference as "sort of a festival ... towards the end for people
who didn't really understand the consequences of words." Id. Others have been more sym-
pathetic to the task undertaken by the drafters. For example, the Norwegian delegation
acknowledged "[tihe challenge was how to accommodate the views of 160 different coun-
tries and create a Court credible in the eyes of the world. The answer is a global solution, a
historic compromise." Statement of Norwegian Delegation, U.N. Press Release (July 17,
1998), available in <http://www.un.org/icc/pressrellrom22.htm>.
A colleague put it this way: the rest of the world is approaching the development of in-
ternational law as a legislative process, while the U.S. continues to act as though it is
negotiating a contract. One exercise is collaborative and requires compromise; the other-
particularly when one has the bargaining power the United States historically has enjoyed-
is not. Until America understands this fundamental shift in the nature of the exercise, it is
bound to be frustrated and disappointed. (These comments are heavily paraphrased from a
conversation with Garth Meintjes on Nov. 5, 1998).
68. In his comments, Rubin emphasized three "basic" flaws, and discussed several other
"issues"; these have been combined and rearranged somewhat to comport with the organiza-
tion of this article. See July 20 Press Briefing, supra note 63.
69. There is some irony connected with this last assertion. The chances for American
participation were never great; even before the Conference several prominent American
Senators and military officials expressed their objections to the Statute. The United States
has failed to ratify most contemporary human rights treaties and many of the jus in bello
treaties and protocols from which the Rome Statute derives its definitions of war crimes.
Moreover, the United States has consistently resisted the jurisdiction of international tribu-
nals, and indeed withdrew from the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice when that tribunal agreed to hear Nicaragua's claims that the U.S. support of the
Contras constituted a violation of international law. See supra note 64.
70. Rubin identified these, along with the inclusion of the crime "transferring popula-
tion into an occupied territory" as "last minute bone[s] thrown in":
[i]ncluding the inclusion of the crime of aggression, despite the drafters' failure to
define that crime; the drafters' unwillingness to permit reservations to the treaty;
the possibility that nuclear weapons may someday be included in such a way ....
July 20 Press Briefing, supra note 63; see also ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT, July 17, 1998, art. 5(2) & 120, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 [hereinafter
ROME STATUTE] (leaving open the definition of aggression and prohibiting reservations,
respectively). The refusal to permit reservations forecloses the recent American practice of
ratifying subject to "reservations understandings and declarations" which severely limit the
reach of the document. The implication of Rubin's linkage of criticism of non-reservations
provisions to criticisms related to defining aggression and the treatment of nuclear weapons
under the Statute suggests that the U.S. considers its ability to limit the crimes for which its
nationals will be subject to the Court's jurisdiction essential to U.S. participation in the Stat-
ute.
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prosecutor's ability to investigate crimes about which no state party has
complained." Third, the U.S. criticized the defeat of an opt-out provi-
sion that would have permitted countries to ratify the treaty with the
expectation that for the first ten years the court's jurisdiction would only
be effective over the crime of genocide, so as to permit those nations
with "international peace keeping responsibilities and security obliga-
tions ... to see the court in action. '2 Perhaps most stridently the U.S.
objected to the Court's exercise of jurisdiction over crimes committed
by nationals of states not party to the treaty; the U.S. declared that
"[n]ever before" had a treaty asserted jurisdiction over states not party
to it, in violation of "the most fundamental principal [sic] of treaty
law. 73 The U.S. further complained, albeit somewhat inconsistently,
that working in conjunction with the seven-year opt-out provision the
exercise of jurisdiction over the nationals of non-parties would shield
nationals of ratifying states from accountability for war crimes viola-
tions, while leaving the nationals of non-ratifying states open to possible
punishment. 4
71.
[T]he treaty includes a provision allowing the court's prosecutor to initiate inves-
tigations even when no state party seeks such an investigation. This means that
despite our best efforts, the court will be deluged with complaints from well-
meaning individuals in organizations that will want the court to address every
wrong in the world. This will turn the court into a human rights ombudsman and
limit its ability to investigate the most serious crimes. It will also leave the court
open to frivolous and politically motivated complaints.
July 20 Press Briefing, supra note 63.
72. Id. Curiously, at the press conference no one questioned the somewhat startling
proposition that the very nations most expected to use armed force, those with international
peace keeping and security obligations, should be excused from accountability for violating
jus in bello; nor did anyone question the relative merits of the defeated ten year opt-out pro-
vision over the included seven year opt-out provision.
73. Based on research done "[that] morning," Rubin declared:
Never before has a treaty in international law ... put itself over those who have
not been included in it. The nation state is the fundamental unit in the international
system, and international law.., has not before seen a treaty try to impose itself
on those who have not signed it.
Id. Rubin's information was regrettably incomplete: he neglected to consider the circum-
stances of the precursor to the Rome Statute, the Nuremberg Charter, the treaty in which
Allied forces agreed to subject Axis nationals to the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal.
Moreover, this objection is inconsistent with settled principles of extra-territorial criminal
jurisdiction, often invoked by the United States itself to justify the prosecution of persons
who have committed crimes against the United States or U.S. nationals. For a fuller discus-
sion of this and other issues, see infra Part I.G.
74. See ROME STATUTE art. 124 (providing for seven-year "transitional period" sus-
pending war crimes jurisdiction for States Parties at their option). Since the U.S. was one of
the strongest proponents of the inclusion of an opt-out provision, it seems somewhat incon-
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These specific objections all identify possible defects in the Statute
itself. However, underlying these concerns are larger practical and po-
litical questions identified by the U.S. delegation. First, whether the
proposed Criminal Court will undermine the authority of the Security
Council, by either contradicting Council determinations of the existence
of a threat to international peace and security, or confusing matters by
addressing a conflict when the Council is already involved and where an
authoritative unitary response will best reduce international tension.
Equally emphasized is the concern that members of the U.S. armed
forces, in fulfilling their wide-ranging peacekeeping and security obli-
gations, would be subject to frivolous, politically motivated charges.
One could easily imagine such a scenario: American servicemen on
duty in the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf conflict or in the operations in So-
malia would be subject to frivolous charges raised in the Court by Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein or Somali leader General Aidid solely to de-
flect international criticism from their own egregious behavior. Then, in
order to avoid the possibility of 'malicious prosecution' of this nature,75
the U.S. reduces its commitment to participate in crucial international
peacekeeping missions, thereby increasing the risk of global instability
and war.
There are many ways to evaluate the U.S. objections and whether or
not they represent a significant and unacceptable threat to U.S. national
security interests and indeed, international security interests. First, is it
fair to criticize the Rome Statute as leaving peace keepers subject to
unreasonable risks of being charged with crimes intended to fulfill a
nation's (or rogue prosecutor's) political agenda? If so, would the risk
of such politically motivated charges act as a powerful disincentive to
participation in peacekeeping missions? Second, what are the legal im-
plications of the U.S. objections, and what are the possible
consequences they will have on international peace and security? Before
turning to these questions it is first necessary to understand the way in
which the Statute approaches the important underlying questions of ju-
risdiction.
sistent that the U.S. should complain about the undesirable effects flowing from the inclu-
sion of such a clause.
75. Although it captures the tenor of the U.S. objection, the term malicious prosecution
is used here with some caution. The common definition of malicious prosecution requires the
charges be brought without any foundation. By contrast, the charge the United States makes,
that it will be subject to "purely political" criminal charges, does not question the validity of
the charges, but rather the motivation of the state or Prosecutor in electing to pursue the
claims.
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The Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court
The statute adopted in Rome sets up a comprehensive structure in-
tended to secure the international vindication of serious international
crimes. The Statute has thirteen parts, and sets up an integrated means
of addressing international crimes. It combines investigatory and prose-
cutorial functions in the office of the Prosecutor, and establishes three
judicial bodies in the form of a Pre-Trial Division, Trial Division, and
Appeals Division. In addition, the Statute anticipates legislative func-
tions to be fulfilled by the Assembly of States Parties, which will have
the authority to refine certain functions of the Court and, further, to re-
fine the definitions of crimes and hence the jurisdictional reach of the
Court.76 The powers of the Court include arrest, and, upon conviction,
imprisonment, and imposition of fines and forfeiture of the property of
individuals; it does not provide for state responsibility.
The aspects of the Statute deemed objectionable by the United
States primarily relate to core principles of various aspects of the
Court's jurisdiction: the scope of crimes that will fall within the juris-
diction of the Court; the jurisdiction afforded to the Court's Prosecutor;
the relative jurisdictional authority of the Criminal Court and the U.N.
Security Council; and the Criminal Court's jurisdictional authority over
non-signatories to the treaty. 7  This description of the Statute will focus
on those aspects of the proposed Court that directly bear on these con-
cerns.78 Where appropriate, the American objections to specific
provisions of the Statute will be addressed.
A. Crimes Falling under the Court's Jurisdiction: Aggression
The list of crimes falling under the purview of the Court is reminis-
cent of the charges heard by the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals.
Designated "the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole,"79 the Court's anticipated jurisdiction includes
the crime of aggression, the crime of genocide, crimes against human-
ity, and war crimes."8
76. Another important task anticipated by the Statute is the development of "elements
of crimes." ROME STATUTE art. 9.
77. See infra Part I.G. (describing the U.S. objections).
78. As a consequence, omitted from this description will be a discussion of the require-
ments for state cooperation in trial and enforcement; procedural aspects, including trial and
appellate procedures; and available penalties. See ROME STATUTE pts. 6-13.
79. Id. art. 5; see also id. art. 17 (providing that cases lacking "sufficient gravity" to be
held inadmissible by the Court).
80. Id. art. 5.
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Most controversially, the Court is granted prospective jurisdiction
over crimes of "aggression" (violations of jus ad bello), pending further
agreement by the parties as to the definition of aggression and the scope
of the Court's jurisdiction over that crime.8' The case for including the
crime of aggression is historically and legally compelling. Historically,
aggression was a crime recognized in the Nuremberg Charter.12 Moreo-
ver, the inclusion of "aggression" recognizes the continuing efforts of
the international community to outlaw crimes against peace: the Kel-
logg-Briand Pact, the U.N. Charter, certain regional agreements and key
General Assembly resolutions all outlaw aggression, identifying it as the
fundamental threat to international peace and security, international sta-
bility, and international human rights. 3 Finally, as the Nuremberg
Charter implicitly acknowledges, it is difficult to separate the question
of how armed force has been used (jus in bello) from why it was used
(jus ad bello);" thus, providing the Court with jurisdiction to consider
both aspects of the law of war is an appropriate solution. Most states
today would recognize the prohibition against aggression as variously a
norm, jus cogens or obligatio erga omnes,"5 deserving of inclusion in the
Rome Statute; however, today, as in the post-World War II era, there is
little agreement as to how the crime of aggression should be defined 6
and perhaps more importantly, who will determine whether the crime of
aggression has been committed-hence, the deferment of the issue to
later proceedings.
81. Id. arts. 5, 121 & 123.
82. See Matthew Lippman, Nuremberg: Forty-Five Years Later, 7 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1,
30-32 (1991) (describing the inclusion of the crime "crimes against peace" in the Nurem-
berg Charter).
83. See supra note 13 (discussing these documents).
84. Notably, the Nuremberg Charter's definition of war crimes turns on the principle of
"military necessity," which in turn may speak to the legitimacy of the military effort. See
supra note 23 (setting forth the Nuremberg Charter definitions of crimes).
85. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Om-
nes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 68 (1996).
86. See Lippman, supra note 82, at 30 ("The [Nuremberg] drafting conference.., was
unable to agree on a precise definition of war of aggression which constituted a Crime
Against Peace."); see also Stephen McCaffrey, The Fortieth Session of the International Law
Commission, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 150, 153 (1989) (noting that the ILC undertook to define
aggression without acknowledging the controversy over defining aggression had effectively
derailed the work of the ILC in 1954); id. (describing the disagreement embodied in General
Assembly Resolution 3314, Definition of Aggression (1974)); Pejic, supra note 49, at 312
(describing the dispute about the decision to include aggression during the later drafting
stages).
87. It is perhaps in this regard that American interests are most at risk. Pursuant to arti-
cles 121 & 123 of the Statute, see supra note 81 and accompanying text, the process
anticipated for adopting a definition of aggression will only be open to parties to the treaty.
According to the announced intent of the United States, this will prohibit direct American
participation in the continuing development of this norm; however, as a member of the
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In the draft statute considered during the Rome Conference, three
different definitions of the crime of aggression, each proposed defini-
tion including several variations, were submitted for consideration.88
The fact that none was adopted may be in part a reflection of the vary-
ing degrees of deference afforded the Security Council in each
definition. The first option advanced language designed to preserve the
roles of the United Nations and the Security Council in matters related
to threats to international peace and security. 9 In its most benign form
the variations denominated "Option 1" deemed the crime of aggression
to be the planning, preparation, ordering, initiation, or carrying out of
"an armed attack ... against the ... territorial integrity ... of another
State."90 In its most extreme variant, this definition condemned only
"war[s] of aggression ... in contravention of the Charter of the United
Nations as determined by the Security Council,"'" thereby rendering the
Court subject to the authority of the Council for the purposes of trying
cases in which aggression has been alleged. Like the Nuremberg Charter
which it resembles, Option 1 focused on generally accepted principles
of international law, eschewing specific definitions in favor of broad
prohibitions.92
The second proposed definition, Option 2, focused instead on cer-
tain acts "of sufficient gravity," which, when measured against an
objective scale, constitute aggression.93 This formulation consequently
includes a non-exclusive list of potentially illegal acts which "threaten
or violate the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence
of a state;"'94 included in this list is invasion, bombardment, occupation,
United Nations, the United States may participate in one of the anticipated processes for
recommending definitions for adoption or other amendments to the treaty. See ROME STAT-
UTE art. 123 (providing that the Secretary General shall, after an interval of seven years, and
may, at other times, upon the request of a state party, convene a Review Conference open to
the Assembly of States Parties); see also ROME STATUTE art. 112 (establishing Assembly of
States Parties, the representational, non-judicial organ of the ICC).
88. See Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Estab-
lishment of an International Criminal Court, Apr. 14, 1998, U.N. Doc. AICONF.183/2/add.1
(1998) [Hereinafter Draft Statute] (containing the Draft Statute for the International Criminal
Court).
89. See id. at 12-14. The text of the proposed definitions of "aggression" are found as
an appendix to this article.
90. Id. at 12; see Option I of Appendix A.
91. Id. An intermediate variant would have left the determination of what constitutes a
violation of the Charter up to the Court.
92. The Nuremberg Charter defined crimes against peace as aggression "in violation of
international treaties, agreements or assurances." See supra note 23 (excerpting the provi-
sions of the Charter).
93. Draft Statute, supra note 88, at 13; see Option 2 of Appendix A.
94. Id.
[Vol. 20:337
Grotius Repudiated
blockades, and other recognized belligerent acts. In relying on these
objective indicators, Option 2 borrowed heavily from a past U.N. at-
tempt to define aggression, General Assembly Resolution 3314,
Resolution on the Definition of Aggression. 95 An important consequence
of defining aggression objectively is that it permits a measure of inde-
pendence from Security Council determinations.96
The third proposed definition, like Option 2, targeted actions threat-
ening to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence
of the state. Like proposed Option 1, Option 3 in its most extreme ver-
sion defers to the determinations of the Security Council. However,
Option 3 takes a more subjective approach to defining aggression by
looking to the motives behind the attack and condemning "armed attack
... undertaken in ... contravention of the Charter of the United Nations
[with the object or result of establishing a [military] occupation of, or
annexing, the territory of such other State or part thereof by armed
forces of the attacking State.]"9
When the parties to the Statute again turn their attention to this
troubling definitional question, it is likely the debate will center on two
issues: (1) the appropriate role of the Security Council in determining
that the crime of aggression has occurred and (2) the relative merits of
relying on an objective set of factors over a more subjective standard.
For the purposes of analysis in this article, the crime of "aggression"
will be assumed to be defined in accordance with Option 2, which has
the benefit, due to its derivation from General Assembly Resolution
3314, of being long-standing and having previously garnered the sup-
port of a majority of U.N. members.
B. Other Crimes Falling under the Court's Jurisdiction
Unlike the crime of aggression, the crimes of genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes are defined in the Statute.9" Those
definitions are drawn heavily from definitions of those crimes as estab-
lished in prior specific conventions and other international agreements. 99
95. See supra note 13.
96. See id.; see also McCaffrey, supra note 86, at 159-60 (describing the policy con-
cerns behind the adoption of the resolution). As a practical matter, in 1974, the height of the
Security Council's Cold War stalemate, the General Assembly might have been more frus-
trated by the Council's inaction.
97. Draft Statute, supra note 88, at 14; see Option 3 of Appendix A.
98. See ROME STATUTE arts. 6-8.
99. Compare ROME STATUTE art. 6 (definition of genocide) with Genocide Convention,
supra note 9, art. II (definition of genocide); see also ROME STATUTE art. 8 (including in the
definition of war crimes "[g]rave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949"
and explicitly incorporating many of those provisions).
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However, many innovations are incorporated into the Statute's defini-
tions of crimes. Notably, forced pregnancy is included as both a crime
against humanity and a war crime.'"° This dual inclusion reflects, in part,
reactions to the experiences of the Bosnian conflict.' °' In a similar re-
flection of past international concern, apartheid is included as a crime
against humanity.' 2 In a somewhat controversial measure, the definition
of "serious" war crimes' 3 also includes "[t]he transfer ... by the Occu-
pying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it
occupies."' ' The inclusion of this language is viewed as responding to,
in large part, the continuing Israeli occupation of the West Bank and
Gaza Strip.' 5
C. Limitations on the Court's Jurisdiction
Despite the far-reaching scope of these definitions, in all respects
the jurisdiction of the Court is potentially circumscribed. One ground
for dismissal of a case as inadmissible is that "[t]he case is not of suffi-
cient gravity to justify further action by the Court,"'" a ground which
expressly recognizes that some crimes are just not "worth" prosecut-
ing-at least, not by the Criminal Court.' 7 One important limitation,
relating to intent, is incorporated in the definitions of the particular
crimes. For example, the definition of genocide requires the specific
100. See ROME STATUTE arts. 7(l)(g), 8(2)(b)(xxii) (criminalizing rape, sexual slavery,
enforced prostitution, and forced pregnancy).
101. See Meron, supra note 48, at 464 (describing the Yugoslavia Tribunal's cofntribu-
tions towards the recognition of sexual violence as a crime against humanity). Neither the
systematic use of sexual violence against women as a strategy of war, nor the condoning of
soldiers' sexual abuse of women by military authorities is a new problem; rape is broadly
prohibited by the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Indeed, during the course of World War II
widespread abuse of Chinese women was perpetrated by the Japanese military. See generally
YUKI TANAKA, HIDDEN HORRORS, JAPANESE WAR CRIMES IN WORLD WAR II 92-110 (1996)
(describing establishment of comfort houses); COMFORT WOMEN: AN UNFINISHED OR-
DEAL-REPORT OF A MISSION BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS (Ustinia
Dolgopol & Snehal Paranjape eds., 1994) (same). However, while the victorious Allied
command was aware of these crimes, they were not among the crimes prosecuted during the
Tokyo Tribunal. Id.
102. See ROME STATUTE art. 7(I)(j).
103. The Statute maintains a distinction between "grave" and "serious" war crimes.
104. ROME STATUTE art. 8(2)(b)(viii).
105. See Statement by Judge Eli Nathan, Head of the Delegation of Israel (July 17,
1998), available at <http://www.un.org/icc/speeches/717isr.htm> (expressing doubt that this
crime "really ranks among the most heinous and serious war crimes" and asserting the Con-
ference had been subverted for the purposes of Middle East politics).
106. ROME STATUTE art. 17(1)(d).
107. The fact that the crime is not sufficiently grave to warrant prosecution in the
Criminal Court would not foreclose prosecution in national courts under the principles of
universal or extraterritorial jurisdiction.
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intent "to destroy, in whole or in part," a protected group, °8 while the
definition of crimes against humanity requires a showing that the ac-
cused engaged in a "widespread or systematic attack directed against [a]
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack. 'c' The Court's juris-
diction over war crimes similarly requires the crimes be committed "as
part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of
crimes."" It is possible that in applying these norms the Court will
adopt an approach similar to that taken by the Yugoslavia Tribunal,
which has held that liability may arise from a sole occurrence, if that
action is linked to a broader course of conduct."' If that interpretation is
adopted, there may be responsibility under the Statute for a single hei-
nous act which is part of a broad campaign even if the purpose of the
campaign is not to target civilians. However, as stated, the intent re-
quirements of the definitions of genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity may potentially restrict the prosecution of those
crimes to those arising from purposeful action and resulting in cata-
strophic damage. If so, the Court may interpret the Statute as rejecting
the notion that single or sporadic episodes resulting in significant civil-
ian casualties and damage should be subject to the scrutiny of the
international community and as rejecting new thinking that mass suf-
fering caused indirectly, for example by a state's economic policies,
should also be considered genocide.
The Statute's definition of war crimes is further limited by the re-
quirement that certain crimes occur during an "international armed
conflict."" 2 This limitation will potentially deprive the Court of juris-
diction in circumstances where the use of armed force does not amount
to "armed conflict." When civilian casualties result, some of these cir-
cumstances might constitute a crime against humanity, permitting
review under that provision. Moreover, the expansive invocation of the
right to self-defense, based on liberal interpretation of what constitutes
armed attack"3 might serve as a basis for similarly liberalizing the defi-
nition of international armed conflict.
108. Protected groups include national, ethnical, racial, or religious groups. ROME
STATUTE art. 6.
109. Id. art. 7(1).
110. Id. art. 8(1).
111. See Meron, supra note 48, at 464-65 (discussing this and related aspects of the
Yugoslavia Tribunal's decision concerning the scope of the charge crime against humanity).
112. ROME STATUTE art. 8(b); see also id. art 8(2)(a) (referring to the Geneva Conven-
tions of 1949 which include a similar limitation).
113. See supra note 19.
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D. States' Complementary Jurisdiction over International Crimes, 4
The jurisdictional reach of the Court is also tempered by the incor-
poration of the principle of complementary jurisdiction. The Statute
recognizes-indeed, "emphasiz [es]"-that the Criminal Court is in-
tended to be "complementary to national criminal jurisdictions."" 5
Accordingly, a matter is to be deemed by the Court as inadmissible if it
is "being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction
over it,"" 6 if the state is able and genuinely willing to proceed."7 Matters
are also inadmissible in circumstances where a state with jurisdiction
has investigated the crimes, but has elected not to prosecute, "unless the
decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genu-
inely to prosecute."" 8 Thus, if it appears a state is exercising jurisdiction
merely in an attempt to shield the accused, or if it appears that the pro-
ceedings are neither independent nor impartial, the Court will exercise
jurisdiction regardless of state participation."9 In this way, states-
114. This principle has also been referred to as "complementarity" during the drafting
process. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Observations Concerning the 1997-98 Preparatory
Committee's Work, 25 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 397, 411-12, J1l 28-32 (1997). The con-
trary principle of primacy was incorporated in the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals'
statutes. See Bartram Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of
National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 383, 386 (1998).
Indeed in the case of the Tadic prosecution, the Yugoslavia Tribunal assumed jurisdiction
after German courts had initiated proceedings against Tadic in its domestic courts. Id. at 403.
115. ROME STATUTE preamble. This aspiration could be considered naive: "[piractice
has shown.., that governments are rarely willing to hold their own citizens accountable,
especially when the individuals involved occupy positions of political or military authority."
Pejic, supra note 49, at 292-93 (1998).
116. ROME STATUTE art. 17(a). Article 12 suggests that states with jurisdiction include
both those where "the conduct in question occurred" and "the state of which the person ac-
cused of the crime is a national." Id. art. 12.
117. Indeed, the willingness of a state with jurisdiction to undertake an investigation is
sufficient to halt any investigation by the Court's Prosecutor. See infra note Part I.E.
(describing duties of the prosecutor). A related, significant question concerning the willing-
ness, yet apparent inability, of a state to proceed is provided by the example of the Rwanda
Tribunal. Important to the national populace is the willingness of Rwandan courts to judge
the actions of Rwandan war criminals is acknowledged by the Statute for the Rwanda Tribu-
nal; however, in practice, the Rwandan judicial and criminal justice systems have been
overwhelmed by the number of trials, resulting in backlogs and uneven justice. See Madeline
Morris, The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda, 7 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 349 (1997) (discussing the complexities of the joint jurisdictional arrangement); but
see Jose Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lesson from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L
(forthcoming 1999) (noting the drawbacks to the Tribunal's exercise of jurisdiction notwith-
standing the challenges faced by Rwandan domestic courts).
118. ROME STATUTE art. 17(b). See generally Brown, supra note 114 (describing the
principles of complementary jurisdiction).
119. Cf. ROME STATUTE art. 20(3) (prohibiting retrial by the Court on double jeopardy
grounds of cases pursued in national courts unless the national case was intended to shield
the accused, or was not conducted in an impartial and independent fashion). The Statute also
provides for superseding Court jurisdiction when a state with jurisdiction is undertaking an
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including states not party to the Statute'2 0 are encouraged to police
themselves rigorously, thereby avoiding scrutiny in an international fo-
121
rum.
E. The Role of the Court's Prosecutor 22
Equally significant as the definitions of crimes over which the Court
has jurisdiction are the means by which crimes are brought before the
Court. The primary conduit to the proposed Criminal Court is the
Court's prosecutor, to whom the Statute grants significant powers to
investigate potential crimes.2 1 States may refer matters to the Prosecutor
if the state believes "a situation [exists] in which one or more crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been committed.' 24
In addition, the Security Council may refer a matter to the Prosecutor,'
2
or the Prosecutor may initiate investigations proprio motu ("on her own
motion") on the basis of information provided by non-state party
126
sources.
Before proceeding with a full investigation, the Prosecutor in all
circumstances is required to judge the validity of the information and
the seriousness of the charge; in order to proceed there must exist "a
reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the
overzealous or vindictive prosecution, in violation of recognized individual rights. Id. art.
20(3)(b) (stating that the Court may retry in instances when the national proceeding were not
conducted "in accordance with the norms of due process recognized by international law").
The Statute includes no express provision as to how to reconcile inconsistent results.
120. See infra Part I.G. (describing Court jurisdiction over states not party to the Stat-
ute).
121. A further complication is provided by Article 90, which resolves competing
claims of jurisdiction. A state, which seeks vigorously to prosecute an international crime
which falls under the Court's jurisdiction but which does not already have custody of the
accused, may be required to defer to the Court's jurisdiction. See ROME STATUTE art. 90. If
the state with custody is a party to the Statute, a complicated priority system is to be used to
determine whether the accused must be released to the requesting state or the Court. This
system should take into account the status of any international extradition treaties between
the states, the dates of the competing requests, and the strength of the requesting state's in-
terest in the crime committed. See id. arts. 90(4) & 90(6).
122. As M. Cherif Bassiouni points out, from the perspective of the Anglo-American
legal tradition, the International Criminal Court is inaptly named; the Rome Statute estab-
lishes a more complex structure, including a Prosecutor as well as several different courts,
and is more accurately considered a "tribunal." See Bassiouni, supra note 114, at 410, 27.
123. ROME STATUTE art. 13. The powerful gatekeeping functions of the Prosecutor re-
quire the Prosecutor to ask many of the same questions as to admissibility as could be
presented to the Trial Court at later times in the proceedings. See infra notes 127-30 and
accompanying text.
124. Id. art. 14.
125. See ROME STATUTE art. 13.
126. See id. art. 15.
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Court has been or is being committed." '127 The Prosecutor must also
evaluate the potential admissibility of the case and therefore the will-
ingness of any state with jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the
matter. The Prosecutor's assessment also must take into account the
"interests of justice."' 28 With regard to matters not referred by a state
party or the Security Council, if the Prosecutor concludes that a full in-
vestigation is warranted, the approval of the Pre-Trial Chamber is a an
additional prerequisite for further action. 29 Indeed, in all cases the Pre-
Trial Chamber exercises tight supervisory control over the Prosecutor
and is available to hear complaints of states interested in the Prosecu-
tor's activities. 30
The Prosecutor's investigation is required by the Statute to be bal-
anced: incriminating and exonerating circumstances are to be
investigated with equal vigor."' Moreover, the Prosecutor is required to
respect the procedural rights of persons connected with the investiga-
tion; any such persons are protected from being compelled to confess
guilt and are protected from coercion or duress, arbitrary arrest, or de-
tention; and all questioning must be conducted in a language the person
understands. 32 Suspects are entitled to notification of their status as tar-
gets, and their right to assistance of counsel and to remain silent.
33
Notwithstanding these important limitations, the Prosecutor is given
broad investigatory authority, including the authority to conduct on-site
investigations, 34 and, with the approval of the Pre-Trial Chamber, to
initiate arrest proceedings. "3 The Prosecutor may gather information
from states, inter-governmental organizations, including U.N. organs,
127. Id. art. 53. For a description of the scope of the powers of the Prosecutor antici-
pated in the draft, see Pejic, supra note 49, at 304-05.
128. Note that article 53(c) of the Rome Statute provides,
A prosecution is not in the interest of justice, taking into account all the circum-
stances, including the gravity of the crime, the interests of the victims and the age
or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged crime.
129. See id. art. 15(4).
130. See, e.g., id. arts. 15, 18, 19, 54, 58, 61 & 72.
131. See id. art. 54(1).
132. See id. art. 55(1). In addition to the explicit rights described herein, the Statute
generally requires the organs of the ICC to act in a manner consistent with "internationally
recognized human rights." Id. art. 21(3).
133. See id. art. 55(2). Many of these rights attach whether the investigation is carried
out by the Prosecutorial staff directly or by national authorities acting at the Prosecutor's
behest. Similar rights attach at later stages of the proceedings, and evidence obtained in vio-
lation of these rules is generally subject to exclusion. See id. arts. 55(2), 67; see generally
Kenneth Gallant, Individual Human Rights in a New International Organization: A First
Look at the Statute of the International Criminal Court (forthcoming) (describing the sys-
temic inclusion of these important rights in the Statute).
134. See ROME STATUTE art. 54(2).
135. See id. art. 58.
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non-governmental organizations, and "other reliable sources."'3 6 In order
to facilitate these efforts, the Prosecutor may enter into agreements nec-
essary to facilitate state cooperation; 137 the Statute anticipates that
confidentiality may be a necessary component of such agreements.
1 38
F. The Role of the Security Council
The Statute anticipates an independent court, with only a limited
role performed by the Security Council. This approach rejects earlier
suggestions that a permanent tribunal be established solely to accept
referrals by the Security Council-a "permanent ad hoc tribunal." The
Rome Statute permits state parties, the Security Council, and others to
bring matters to the attention of the Prosecutor. Referrals by the Council
are not privileged, but subject to the same prosecutorial requirements as
any other referral. 3 9
Respecting questions of law, the Statute provides the Court with
true independence. The Court may be capable to decide the scope of its
jurisdiction and powers, and it is empowered to resolve disputes con-
cerning the interpretation of the Statute that implicate the Court's
judicial functions. 4 This independence builds on the model provided by
the Yugoslavia Tribunal, that, over the objections of the United States,
determined that the Court, and not the Security Council which created
it, should resolve questions of jurisdiction and authority."''
One very important power has been reserved to the Council.
Pursuant to Article 16, the Council has the authority to delay an
investigation or prosecution for renewable periods of twelve months, if
so ordered by a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter."'2 Accordingly, the Council must determine that there exists a
136. Id. art. 58.
137. See id. art. 54(3)(d). This article also authorizes the Prosecutor to enter into
agreements with intergovernmental organizations.
138. See id. art. 54(3)(e).
139. See supra Part I.G. (describing limitations on Prosecutorial investigations); see
also Brown, supra note 114, at 427-29 (describing suggested models in the draft Statute for
the role of the Security Council).
140. See ROME STATUTE art. 119(1). Other disputes are to be settled through negotia-
tion, reference to the Assembly of States Parties, and, if necessary, reference to the World
Court.
141. See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Decision in Prose-
cutor v. Tadic (Establishment of the International Tribunal), Oct. 2, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 32, 40-
41 (1996) [hereinafter Tadic Case] (holding the tribunal may "examine the legality of its
establishment by the Security Council, solely for the purpose of ascertaining its own
'primary' jurisdiction over the case before it"). See also Jose Alvarez, Nuremberg Revisited:
The Tadic Case, 7 EUR. J. INT'L L. 245 (1996) (discussing case and implications of judg-
ment).
142. See ROME STATUTE art. 16
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"threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression," under
Chapter VII'43 and that the situation will best be served by delaying the
proceedings of the Criminal Court.'" Rejected was a provision that
would have automatically stayed the Court's hand in any circumstance
being dealt with by the Council under Chapter VII, unless the Council
specifically authorized action by the Criminal Court. 45 Like all Chapter
VII resolutions, Council action will be subject to the veto of one of the
permanent members. 46 Notably, the request will expire without further
action by the Council; this provision requires that the political
consensus in favor of delay be maintained if the jurisdiction of the Court
is to be preempted for additional periods.
47
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this
Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution
adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the
Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same
conditions.
Id.
143. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
144. Articles 40 and 41 of the U.N. Charter permit the Council to take action which
will "prevent ... aggravation of the situation," and to "give effect to its decisions;" it is
further empowered to require states not party to the dispute to comply with decisions so
enacted. See id. arts. 40, 41 & 48, respectively.
The Statute's provision may be an indirect response to questions raised in the Interna-
tional Court of Justice ("ICJ") about the competing jurisdiction of the ICJ and Security
Council. In The Lockerbie Cases, the question presented was whether the Council should act
in a manner inconsistent with the jurisdiction of the ICJ: Libya requested a judicial determi-
nation as to whether it had a right under an international aviation safety convention, to try
the suspected suspects in an incident of aircraft terrorism itself; the Security Council subse-
quently ordered Libya to extradite the suspects to the United States or United Kingdom. See
Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Conven-
tion Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J., reprinted in
37 I.L.M. 587 (1998).
While it has the beneficial aspect of removing any ambiguity in times of international
crisis, one might question the appropriateness of the privilege granted to the Council in the
Rome Statute. Savvy parties negotiating with the Council with regard to an international
dispute might attempt to bargain for deferral of Criminal Court proceedings as part of the
settlement. Furthermore, nations with significant political power (or allied with those with
political power) might use this mechanism to avoid criminal liability. Either scenario creates,
or, some would say, exacerbates, the undesirable impression that immunity from criminal
liability is for sale. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The
Need for Accountability, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 11 (1996) ("justice is all too fre-
quently bartered away for political settlements").
145. See Pejic, supra note 49, at 321-22.
146. See U.N. CHARTER art. 27(3) ("Decisions [under Chapter VIII shall be made by an
affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent mem-
bers.").
147. Notably, certain long-standing sanctions imposed by the Council have come under
criticism because removal of the sanctions requires unanimity amongst the permanent five
members. For example, it is unclear that all of the permanent members of the Council would
vote today to continue the crushing economic sanctions imposed on Iraq's populace in re-
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G. Court Jurisdiction over Non-Signatory States and Nationals
Articles 12 and 13 determine the necessary state consent to Court
jurisdiction that is required to proceed in each case. These articles,
working together, permit the Court to exercise jurisdiction over the na-
tionals of non-state parties under limited circumstances. If the matter is
not one referred to the Court by the Security Council pursuant to Article
13,148 then the Court may exercise jurisdiction over the matter even if all
of the states involved in the conflict are not parties to the Statute, and
thereby presumed to have consented to jurisdiction. 49 All that is re-
quired is that either the state where the alleged crime was committed be
a party to the Statute,' 50 or the state of which the accused is a national be
a party to the Statute.'' The latter permits states not party to the Statute
to bring cases before the Court, while the former provision permits State
Parties to bring cases before the Court against the nationals of non-state
parties, if the crime was committed on its territory.
Preliminarily, the U.S. objects to the Statute's purported effect of
"binding" the states, even if they are not party to the Statute. That ob-
jection is a mischaracterization of the effect of the Statute. It is true that
nationals of the U.S. may fall under the jurisdiction of the Court, even if
the U.S. is not party to the Statute, under certain circumstances. How-
ever, if that happens, the U.S., unlike parties to the Statute, will be
under no obligation to assist or cooperate with the prosecution; accord-
ingly, the exercise of jurisdiction over an American national is simply
not equivalent to creating obligations for the United States.52 Further-
more, this exercise of jurisdiction with respect to the serious crimes
defined by the Statute is consistent with long-settled principles of uni-
versal jurisdiction and with state jurisdiction over crimes committed
within its territory or against its nationals. The only true innovation
sponse to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait-notwithstanding the continued intransigence of the
Iraqi leadership. However, because of the way the sanctions are structured, an affirmative
vote of the Council is arguably required for their suspension. The United States has vowed to
veto any such measure until Iraqi President Saddam Hussein is removed from power.
148. A more positive gloss on this condition would be: if the matter is referred by a
state party or whether the Prosecutor has initiated an investigation pursuant to information
provided to her about the matter. See ROME STATUTE arts. 13(a), 13(c) & 15. If the Security
Council refers the matter to the Court under Article 13(b), Article 12 sets no preconditions
implicating consent to the exercise of jurisdiction.
149. See id. art. 12 (2).
150. See id. The territorial jurisdictional basis includes vessels or aircraft registered to
the state.
151. Id.
152. The author thanks Professors Bartram Brown and Doug Cassell for these insights,
and the symposium organizers of Stand Together for Human Rights: A Midwest Celebration
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 4-5, 1998) for providing a stimulating
forum to interact with those and other scholars.
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provided by the Statute is the ability of the state exercising jurisdiction
to refer the matter to the Court for prosecution.'53
More controversially, Article 12 appears to permit the Court to hear
cases even if neither of the states that are party to the underlying dispute
have ratified the Statute. It provides that the Court may exercise juris-
diction over cases where neither state is party to the Statute, as long as
one of the states has "accept[ed] the exercise of jurisdiction of the Court
with respect to the crime in question."'54 American objections have
highlighted this provision by vociferously denouncing the "absurdity"
of Saddam Hussein invoking the jurisdiction of the Criminal Court for
crimes committed by American troops in northern Iraq, while the Court
could not "prosecute Saddam for massacring his own people.'
55
As the world community digests and interprets the import of the
Statute, some have wondered if this language accurately reflects the in-
tent of the drafters, or if it merely reflects the unfortunate result of
sloppy drafting. If it is the latter, it may be easily corrected by amend-
ment. It is also possible that, even if not "corrected," other provisions of
the Statute can blunt the impact of this language. For example, the Court
could expansively interpret the complaining state's acceptance of juris-
diction over the "crime" as including the power to investigate and
prosecute the complaining state's own actions. Or the Prosecutor might
foreclose prosecution as not being "in the interests of justice," under an
expansive reading of that provision."'
However, it is this author's view that the result abhorred by the
United States, whether unintended or not, is not unfortunate at all. On
the contrary, it embraces the high principles which form the basis of
humanitarian law, which privilege the rights of the people over the
rights of the state. Suppose, for example, U.S. forces were guilty of
gross violations of crimes against humanity, and further suppose that the
complaining state, guilty of similar crimes and not a party to the Statute,
presented to the Prosecutor charges against the U.S. forces involved in
the criminal activity. To permit the case to proceed might not be "fair"
to the United States nationals involved, but to ignore the crimes in order
to equalize the political impact on the governments involved would
hardly be fair to the victims of the United States' actions-those to
whom the protections of the Statute are intended to flow: "[o]bjectively
153. It is again worth emphasizing that, if the U.S. elects to initiate its own investiga-
tion and prosecution by exercising its jurisdiction over its nationals. Then even as a non-
party, the U.S. will be permitted to invoke the Statute's provisions for complementary juris-
diction.
154. ROME STATUTE art. 12 (2) & (3).
155. Scheffer, supra note 63.
156. See supra note 128.
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and quantitatively, they constitute the category of human beings for
whom the law of war was most found lacking."'57 Moreover, there is
precedent to such a lopsided approach: the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tri-
bunals. In particular, in the Tokyo Tribunals the claim was made that
the Tokyo defendants should be able to present, as part of their defense,
evidence relating to alleged war crimes violations by the U.S., including
the U.S. bombing of Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki.'58 That argument
was rejected.
H. The "Opt-Out" Provision
Perhaps the most universally condemned provision of the Statute is
Article 124, the so-called "opt-out" provision. Article 124 provides an
incentive for reluctant states to participate in the Criminal Court by
permitting them to reject, for a period of up to seven years, the jurisdic-
tion of the Court with regard to allegations of war crimes violations
against its nationals.'59 The Article additionally anticipates that it will be
reviewed seven years after the Statute is entered into force, at which
time the privilege may no longer be extended to joining states.'60 Thus,
taken together, these provisions provide a powerful incentive for states
to join the Statute, and sooner rather than later.
The objections to this provision come from all sides, and are based
on moral, legal, and practical grounds. If war crimes are sufficiently
157. GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE 285 (1980). The current administra-
tion's commitment to the idea of privileging the rights of civilians is at best equivocal, as
evidenced by the following comments by President Clinton with regard to the American
bombing of Sudan:
Mr. Clinton said today that he stayed awake "till 2:30 in the morning trying to
make absolutely sure that at that chemical plant there was no night shift." He
added: "I didn't want some person who was a nobody to me, but who may have a
family to feed and a life to live, and probably had no earthly idea what else was
going on there, to die needlessly."
Tim Weiner and Steven Myers, After the Attacks: The Overview: Flaws in U.S. Account
Raise Questions on Strike in Sudan, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1998, at Al.
158. See HILLAIRE MCCOUBREY & NIGEL WHITE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED
CONFLICT 334 (1992) (noting that in both the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials this defense was
rejected).
159. Even though the U.S. proposal was for an op-out period often years, article 124 of
the Rome Statute provides,
Transitional Provision: ... [A] State, on becoming a party to this Statute, may de-
clare that, for a period of seven years after the entry into force of this Statute for
the State concerned, it does not accept the jurisdiction of the Court with respect
to... [war crimes] ... when a crimes is alleged to have been committed by its
nationals or on its territory. A declaration under this article may be withdrawn at
any time....
160. See ROME STATUTE arts. 123 & 124.
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serious as to give rise to international criminal liability, can there be any
moral justification for permitting states to avoid these obligations
through the mechanism of the Criminal Court's own statute? Given that
the definitions of war crimes borrows heavily from previous treaties and
long-standing customary law, is it legally appropriate to restrict juris-
diction over those crimes-suggesting that the states that so elect may
avoid responsibility for violations of those obligations? On practical
grounds, it seems unlikely that the purpose of Article 124, to entice
states otherwise reluctant to submit to the Court's jurisdiction, will suc-
ceed. How will parties benefit from the opportunity to evaluate the
Court's application of these standards if the states most at risk-the
very states most likely to engage in conduct constituting war crimes-
elect to invoke Article 124 and are therefore not subject to the Court's
jurisdiction?'6 1
These objections are serious and present important policy questions.
However, they are objections which are solely dependent upon the op-
eration of Article 124. By contrast, the objections of the United States
(which lobbied for a ten year opt-out period) arises from the operation
of this article in concert with Article 12, which permits the Court to ex-
ercise war crimes jurisdiction over nationals of states not party to the
Statute, when the complaining state may be a party to the Statute, but
has opted out of the Court's jurisdiction over war crimes.' 62 In other
words, the U.S. again objects to the political inequity of one state find-
ing another's nationals culpable when the actions of its own nationals
go unchallenged. In some ways this objection misses the point. Article
124 is intended to provide an incentive to join the Statute; it would be a
sorry incentive if states derived no substantial benefit from joining over
not joining, here temporary immunity from war crimes prosecution. The
critical question is whether the potential benefits of providing this op-
tion (increased participation) outweigh the perceived detriment
(possible unfairness).
Perhaps more importantly, the principles that privilege the vindica-
tion of the interests of injured civilians over abstract notions of "fair-
play" between states 16 would favor proceeding in these circumstances.
From the perspective of the injured civilians-those intended to benefit
from the prohibitions against war crimes-the fact that the complaining
161. It can hardly be presumed that the full participation by states such as, for example,
Liechtenstein, Switzerland or Japan will provide meaningful examples by which more mili-
tarily active states can assess the Court's fairness and effectiveness.
162. See supra Part I.G. (describing Court's jurisdictional reach).
163. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
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state might escape prosecution for its own bad actions does not render
the prosecution illegitimate, only incomplete.
A full discussion of the powers of the Court is omitted because the
objections of the U.S. seem to embody the concept of absolute immu-
nity-that is to say, the U.S. objects to the possibility of being subjected
to the Court's jurisdiction at all, and not the eventual vindication at later
stages in the proceedings. Accordingly, this analysis has focused on the
powers of the Prosecutor, the gatekeeper of the Court. Other provisions
not described in detail here might also implicate the objections raised by
the United States, including the procedural mechanisms which permit
state participation in the proceedings, and the process by which states
can lodge objections to the Court's jurisdiction and the authority of the
Prosecutor.
PART I1-THE ROME STATUTE AT WORK: POLITICAL TOOL
OR TOOL OF JUSTICE?
Current and Recent Peacekeeping Operations
The United States has recently participated in a number of high-
profile, politically charged peacekeeping and joint-security operations,1
as well as a number of controversial unilateral military operations.
Within the last fifteen years,'66 the United States has participated in
peacekeeping missions in Iraq (1990)61 Somalia (1992) and Haiti
(1992); in joint-security operations in Grenada (1983),68 the Persian
164. As used herein, "peacekeeping operations" refers to U.N. authorized operations,
whether the forces deployed are authorized to use force, as in the 1990 Gulf War, or de-
ployed merely as observers. "Joint-security operations" refers to NATO or other joint
operations.
165. Excluded from consideration are the numerous covert operations launched by the
United States; excluded as well are U.S. operations in support of guerrilla or rebel factions,
such as the Kurds in Iraq, the Contras in Nicaragua, or the rebel groups of Afghanistan,
which may or may not be considered uses of force. See Case Concerning Military and Para-
military Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 7)
(concluding that such activities may constitute armed forced in violation of international
law) [hereinafter Nicaragua Case].
166. The selection of any time period is, to some extent, arbitrary. The fifteen year fig-
ure is useful because the American approach to peace-keeping operations underwent some
revisions in the mid-1980s in light of the losses suffered in the Beirut barracks bombing.
167. It is a matter of some controversy as to whether current U.S. operations in Iraq are
undertaken as representatives of the U.N.-sponsored coalition or in response to U.S. political
and security interests. See infra notes 208-16 and accompanying text.
168. The United States asserted that it was legitimately acting on behalf of a coalition
of Carribean states; however, that assertion has been capably challenged. See Schacter, supra
note 19.
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Gulf (1987-88)16 and the Balkans (1996-present);' 70 and has acted uni-
laterally to protect national security interests with air-strikes targeting
Libya (1986), invading Panama to secure the custody of General
Manuel Noriega (1989), and, most recently, through air-strikes targeting
Sudan and Afghanistan, in self-defense for terrorist attacks of U.S. em-
bassies located in Kenya and Tanzania (1998).
Because the objections identified by the United States emphasize
the risk of specious, politically motivated charges, the focus of this
analysis will be the three most recent or continuing situations most open
to political dispute are the U.S. operations in: (a) Iraq, (b) Bosnia, and
(c) the Sudan. After a brief synopsis of the relevant facts and an expla-
nation of the possible charges arising from those facts, each situation
will be evaluated against the concerns raised by the United States, as-
suming a hypothetical case brought to the attention of the International
Criminal Court by the state against which the U.S. military action was
targeted.'7 In this evaluation the following questions will be posed: if
the Rome Statute was currently in effect, would the United States be:
(1) unfairly required to defend against politically motivated charges of
aggression;.. (2) unfairly required to defend against politically-
motivated charges of war crimes violations; and (3) subject to conflict-
ing obligations arising from the Security Council and Criminal Court?
169. The United States, together with Great Britain, France, and Italy, deployed naval
forces to protect and regulate shipping endangered by the Iraq-Iran war. Although not pursu-
ant to a pre-existing security agreement, the efforts were coordinated to some extent. See A.
Gioia & N. Ronzitti, The Law of Neutrality: Third States' Commercial Rights and Duties, in
THE GULF WAR OF 1980-88, at 237-40 (Ige Dekker & Harry Post eds., 1992); see also U.S.
Report of Activities in Gulf, 26 I.L.M. 1458 (1987). This operation was notable in part for
the "mistaken" Iraqi attack on the U.S.S. Stark, which left thirty-seven dead, and for the
attack by the U.S.S. Vincennes on Iran Air flight 655, which left 290 civilians dead. See
Neither "Negligent" Nor "Culpable ": The Pentagon Rules out Punishment for the Iran Air-
bus Shootdown, TIME, Aug. 29, 1988 (describing both incidents).
170. Under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO"), the U.S.
is participating in the Stabilization Force ("SFOR") deployed in Bosnia in support of the
December 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina ("the
Dayton Agreement").
171. This exercise is hypothetical in that the jurisdiction of the Court provided in the
Rome Statute does not extend to crimes committed before the Statute's entry into force. See
ROME STATUTE art. 11. Moreover, with regard to the instances arising from operations in
Iraq, that government, like the United States, has announced its opposition to the Rome Stat-
ute.
172. For reasons set forth more fully in text, the assumed definition for aggression is
that of Option 2, set forth in infra notes 257-60 and accompanying text. See also appendix A
in Draft Statute, supra note 88 (setting forth the three options considered at the Rome Con-
ference).
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United States Participation in the Peacekeeping Mission in Iraq
On August 2, 1990, Iraqi troops invaded the tiny nation of Kuwait.'73
Iraq's President Saddam Hussein announced that this "re-annexation" of
Kuwait was justified by past colonial practices that had unlawfully sepa-
rated this "province" from Iraq,14 a situation made critical by an
ongoing controversy concerning the exploitation of oil fields extending
beneath the territory of both nations.'75 Iraq's action was universally de-
cried as an illegal act of aggression;16 the U.N. Security Council, acting
with new-found unanimity and effectiveness, demanded Iraq's uncondi-
tional withdrawal and the restoration of Kuwait's "sovereignty,
independence and territorial integrity."'77 The Security Council imposed
severe economic sanctions and authorized the government of Kuwait
and member states to use "all necessary means" to secure Iraq's with-
drawal.' At the request of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, U.S. forces had
been in the region since August 779 The Council set a deadline of Janu-
ary 15, 1991 for Iraq's withdrawal;8 ° no satisfactory resolution of the
crisis was forthcoming,' and military operations led by U.S. command
commenced. A relentless air campaign, 182 followed by ground assault
into Iraqi territory, had the desired effect, and Kuwait was quickly liber-
ated. Hostilities terminated soon after, and a cease-fire was incorporated
173. See THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE IRAQ-KUWAIT CONFLICT, 1990-1996, at 14
(1996) [hereinafter IRAQ-KUWAIT CONFLICT].
174. Both Iraq and Kuwait had a long-standing relationship with the United Kingdom,
which administered Iraq as a Mandatory Territory under the auspices of the League of Na-
tions until Iraq's independence in 1932 and administered Kuwait as a self-governing
protectorate until its independence in 1961. Prior to that, both Iraq and Kuwait had been part
of the Ottoman Empire. Id. at 89. Iraq has long maintained that Kuwait is both "historically
and legally an integral part of [its] Basrah province." Id. at 8. At other times however, Iraq
has implicitly recognized Kuwait's independence. Id. at 9, 13.
175. Id. at 14.
176. Id. at 15.
177. S.C. Res. 662, U.N. Doc. S/RES/662 (Aug. 9, 1990) (expressing alarm at Iraq's
declaration of a "comprehensive and eternal merger with Kuwait"); see also S.C. Res. 660,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (Aug. 2, 1990) (denouncing Iraq's action and demanding withdrawal);
S.C. Res. 661, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 1990) (same); see generally IRAQ-KUWAIT
CONFLICT, supra note 173, at 15-17.
178. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990).
179. IRAQ-KUWAIT CONFLICT, supra note 173, at 16. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, which
borders Kuwait, requested assistance from several nations as a measure of collective self-
defense permitted under the U.N. Charter. See id.; see also U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
180. See S.C. Res. 678, supra note 178.
181. The coalition forces, headed by United States President George Bush, rejected a
last-minute offer by Iraq to withdraw as unacceptable because of Iraq's refusal to leave be-
hind major weapons and military machinery.
182. Over two thousand sorties per day targeted Iraq.
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into Security Council Resolutions 686 and 687.83 Resolution 687 laid
the future basis for Iraq's relations with Kuwait, including borders and
reparations;' it also set requirements intended to ensure Iraq's future
good behavior as an international citizen.'85 Operations up to the prom-
ulgation of Resolution 687 will be considered the Phase I of U.S.
operations in Iraq.
If Iraq were to bring charges against U.S. forces related to the Phase
I activities, it could present'86 evidence of prima facie violations of the
crime of aggression, which outlaws the "invasion or attack" or bom-
bardment of the territory of another state,'87 and war crimes, including
(1) "intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population;"'88
and (2) "intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such
attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or ... which
would clearly be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall
military advantage anticipated."'8 9 These charges could be lodged
against the United States command for actions taken by American
forces themselves, as well as those taken by other forces at the direction
of the United States central command. 9
183. See S.C. Res. 686, U.N. Doc. S/RES/686 (Mar. 2, 1991) (establishing cease fire
and requiring cooperation); S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991) (establishing
Iraq-Kuwait border).
184. In this regard the actions of the Council were somewhat controversial in that
Resolution 687 legislated formal territorial boundaries. See Keith Harper, Does the United
Nations Security Council Have the Competence to Act as Court and Legislature?, 27 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 103 (1994) (exploring the possible problems arising from Council exer-
cise of powers traditionally reserved to the World Court).
185. The Security Council secured Iraq's agreement, albeit under duress, to destroy and
not rebuild its stockpile of chemical and nuclear weapons: "Iraq shall unconditionally accept
the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of ... [a]ll
chemical and biological weapons and all stockpiles of agents [and] ... [aill ballistic missiles
with a range greater than 150 kilometers." S.C. Res. 687, supra note 183, 8.
186. Conceivably Iraq could supply information to the Prosecutor alleging violations of
every element of every crime, regardless of the legal basis. For the purposes of this analysis,
only those crimes with a reasonable factual basis will be identified. See, e.g., MIDDLE EAST
WATCH, NEEDLESS DEATHS IN THE GULF WAR (1991) [hereinafter NEEDLESS DEATHS]
(providing a careful review of incidents which arguably were war crimes-including actions
by Iraq); cf Initial Complaint Charging George Bush et al with Crimes Against Peace, etc.,
in WAR CRIMES: A REPORT ON UNITED STATES WAR CRIMES AGAINST IRAQ 9 (Ramsey Clark
ed., 1992) ("indicting" former President George Bush and a variety of military and executive
leaders with nineteen counts of crimes against humanity, war crimes and American Consti-
tutional violations); see generally RAMSEY CLARK, THE FIRE THIS TIME: U.S. WAR CRIMES
IN THE GULF (1994) (alleging numerous incidents of war crimes violations by the U.S.).
187. This definition described fully infra, is based on one of the optional definitions
proposed in the draft statute. See infra notes 257-60 and accompanying text.
188. ROME STATUTE art. 8(2)(b)(i).
189. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
190. The United States has acknowledged that forces acting under U.N. authority are
bound to adhere tojus in bello. See DOD Iraq Report, supra 54, at 615-17 (acknowledging
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Most certainly the list of potential war crimes violations would in-
clude the bombing of the Amariyah air-raid shelter in Baghdad by U.S.
forces-the single attack which produced the greatest number of civil-
ian casualties. 9 ' At 4:00 am Baghdad time on February 13, 1991, U.S.
bombers targeted the shelter, located in a residential neighborhood of
Baghdad, with particularly destructive laser-guided bombs. According
to reports by the Iraqi government, approximately 400 Iraqi civilians,
mostly women and children, perished in the resulting fire. 92 The status
of the target is a contested fact:
Originally constructed during the Iran-Iraq War as an air raid
shelter, it had been converted to a military C2 bunker in the
middle of a populated area.... [B]arbed wire had been placed
around [it] its entrances secured to prevent unauthorized access,
and armed guards had been posted.... Iraqi authorities permit-
ted selected civilians ... to use the former air raid shelter part
of the bunker on a level above the C2 center. Coalition authori-
ties were unaware of these civilians in the bunker complex. The
13 February attack of the ... bunker-a legitimate military tar-
get-resulted in the unfortunate deaths of those Iraqi civilians
who had taken refuge above the C2 center. 93
Journalists on the scene saw no evidence of the structural rein-
forcements the U.S. described, and neighbors reported the regular use of
the shelter by civilians.
194
the applicability of the rules of war, including the Geneva and Hague Conventions, on the
conduct of the Gulf War); cf. Julianne Peck, Note, The U.N. and the Laws of War: How Can
the World's Peacekeepers Be Held Accountable?, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 283
(1995) (describing instances of possible war crimes violations by U.N. peacekeepers in Bos-
nia and Somalia and arguing that U.N. peacekeepers should adhere to the standards of
international law-indeed, that the U.N. should affirmatively adopt those obligations).
191. See NEEDLESS DEATHS, supra note 186, at 128-47 (describing the attack and pos-
sible legal consequences); PETER ARNETT, LIVE FROM THE BATTLEFIELD 410-13 (1994)
(journalist's account of incident); but see DOD Iraq Report, supra note 54, at 626 (asserting
that the air-raid shelter had been "converted to a military C2 bunker," and was therefore a
legitimate target); see also Patrick Tyler, War in the Gulf: Strategy; The U.S. Stands Firm on
Bomb Attack and Says Investigation Is Closed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1991, at AI (U.S. as-
sessment of target as purely military in character).
192. See NEEDLESS DEATHS, supra note 186, at 129-30 (noting conflicting reports put-
ting the death toll at variously 310, of which 130 were children, and 204 by government
estimates); see Eyewitness Report: The Bombing of the Al-Amariyah Shelter, Baghdad, in
WAR CRIMES, supra note 182, at 120-22 (describing incident and putting death toll between
400 and 1500, the latter based on civilian estimations); CLARK, supra note 182, at 70-72
(same).
193. DOD Iraq Report, supra note 54, at 626.
194. See ARNETT, supra note 187; see also R.W. Apple, War in the Gulf: Allies Study
New Steps to Avoid Civilians in Bombing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1991, at Al.
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There is some question as to whether or not a single event, even one
producing such significant casualties, falls under the definition of war
crimes, which requires the incident be "part of a plan or part of a large-
scale commission of crimes."'95 A key decision by the Yugoslavia Tri-
bunal suggests that the answer to this question is yes. 9 6 Whether or not
it is indeed appropriate to challenge the legality of this incident alone,
an argument could also be made that the target selection process itself
violated emerging rules of jus in bello by targeting remote contributions
to the Iraqi war effort, such as bridges, power stations, and water and
sewage plants remote from the Kuwaiti theater of operations,'9 7 and con-
sequently increasing the risk of collateral civilian casualties.'9 8 In either
case, United States personnel might have to defend the attack if Iraq
brought proceedings before the Criminal Court.
Phase II of the U.S. operations began as the Iraq-Kuwait conflict
ended. Immediately following the cease fire, two Iraqi dissident coali-
tions-the northern Kurdish minority and the Shiite faction in the
south-erupted in civil war, which Iraq's government quickly moved to
crush. Although much of Iraq's military equipment had been destroyed
or was unavailable, the deployment of military helicopters proved suffi-
cient to decimate the rebellions,' 99 in turn creating a huge refugee,
humanitarian and political crisis, particularly with respect to the Kurd-
ish population.2°° Concerned that the situation would erupt into a new
international crisis, further destabilizing the region, the Security Council
195. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (describing limitation on definition of
war crimes).
196. See generally Meron, supra note 48.
197. See NEEDLESS DEATHS, supra note 186, at 95-147, 231-309 (describing the civil-
ian deaths resulting from both attacks on bridges and other military targets located in
population centers and attacks on targets of questionable military significance).
198. Id. (questioning the targeting selection process). Indeed, immediately following
the Amariyah attack, the U.S. command announced that it was engaged in the process of
reevaluating the selection of targets. See Apple, supra note 190, at A12 (quoting Air Force
officers and other officials). Ironically the day before the attack, an Air Force official at a
routine briefing described the targeting strategy then in place as setting up "killing boxes."
Philip Shenon, War in the Gulf: War Notebook; Air Force Makes the Killing Methodical,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1991, at A15.
For a consideration of the legal issues connected with the selection of targets and collat-
eral civilian damage, see NEEDLESS DEATHS, supra note 186. See also Roger Normand &
Chris af Jochnick, The Legitimization of Violence: A Critical Analysis of Gulf War, 35 HARV.
INT'L L. J. 387 (1994).
199. Later President Hussein resorted to environmental weaponry, draining the marsh-
lands which served as home and cultural and economic touchstone for many Shiites in the
south.
200. The political considerations were exacerbated by fear on the parts of Turkey and
Iran that Kurdish nationals residing in those countries would participate in the uprising in the
hopes of working toward the creation of an independent Kurdish state with territory taken
from each of the three countries.
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adopted Resolution 688, which condemned "the repression of Iraq's
civilian population," and ordered Iraq to end the repression and permit
humanitarian assistance to reach the affected populations."' The Reso-
lution also authorized Members to "contribute" to the humanitarian
relief effort. 0 2 The United States, with France and Britain, implemented
Resolution 688 by establishing "no-fly zones," the first extending from
the thirty-sixth parallel to the northern border, over the region inhabited
by the Kurdish population. °3 Pursuant to the joint directive, enforced by
daily patrols, all Iraqi military aircraft were prohibited from flying in
the zones, upon pain of destruction. 204 Later, a similar exclusion zone
was established in the south, extending from the thirty-second parallel
to the southern border, over areas with Shiite population concentra-
tions.25 Neither zone was authorized by any U.N. action; however, a
majority of countries involved in the Allied coalition announced support
of the U.S.-French-British initiative. The situation remained relatively
static until 1993, which marked the next phase in the U.S. operations in
Iraq. Few, if any, Iraqi civilian casualties have resulted from these over-
flights.2°6 However Iraq could complain that the flights themselves rep-
207
resent an act of aggression.
Beginning in 1993, the U.S. has attacked targets in Iraq, at times
acting unilaterally and at other times acting with the support of, vari-
ously, France, Great Britain, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. This begins
Phase III of the U.S. operations in Iraq. In January 1993, anti-aircraft
installations in southern and northern Iraq were bombed, reportedly in
response to hostile maneuvers by Iraq. °8 Later that year the U.S., acting
alone, fired twenty-three cruise missiles onto Iraq, targeting the intelli-
gence offices located in downtown Baghdad; the U.S. asserted the
201. See S.C. Res. 688, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (Apr. 5, 1991).
202. Id.
203. See Timothy P. McIlmail, No-Fly Zones: The Imposition and Enforcement of Air
exclusion Regimes over Bosnia and Iraq, 17 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 35, 48-59 (1994)
(describing creation of "no-fly zones" and questioning legal authority for their creation).
204. Id. In numerous reported skirmishes, U.S. planes shot down aircrafts "caught" in
the "no-fly zones." In one tragic instance of friendly fire, U.S. planes shot down two heli-
copters carrying high ranking humanitarian relief officials.
205. Id.
206. This is not to belittle the psychological damage caused. When this author traveled
in Northern Iraq in 1991, citizens reported their emotional reactions to the daily overflights
including fear, anxiety, and nightmares.
207. The crime of aggression includes "any military occupation, however temporary."
See infra notes 257-60 and accompanying text (setting forth definition of aggression). See
also Convention on International Civil Aviation (Dec. 7, 1944) U.N.T.S. No. 296 (1948)
[hereinafter Chicago Convention] (recognizing sovereign rights over territorial airspace).
208. The U.S. government reported that Iraqi weapons systems tracked and locked onto
American warplanes patrolling the "no-fly zones."
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attack was made in "self-defense" against a foiled assassination plot
against former President George Bush.2 9 Civilian casualties resulted
from this attack: three missiles struck the residential neighborhood near
the target.2 °
As the Iraqi situation passed the five-year mark, the political situa-
tion in Iraq and neighboring Turkey deteriorated. Disputes within the
Kurdish leadership, and opportunism on the part of Turkey (and, no
doubt, on the part of Iraq) led Iraq to move ground forces to the region
in response to Turkish incursions.21' The U.S. retaliated against this
"violation" of the Northern "no-fly zone" (expansively interpreting "no-
fly" as "no-drive") by attacking targets in the south and unilaterally ex-
tending the southern "no-fly zone."'212 At this time international
commitment to the coalition began to fracture. At the same time, Iraq,
chafing under the stringent sanctions regime and the intrusive weapons
monitoring and destruction program, became increasingly uncoopera-
tive with U.N. weapons inspectors.23 The inspection team charged that
Iraq lied, destroyed and hid evidence and blocked inspections, in viola-
tion of Resolution 687.24 While the U.N. first responded with a virtual
unanimity of purpose to these and other problems, for a variety of rea-
sons the political will no longer favors military responses to violations
of the dictates of Resolution 687.25 In early 1998, the United States,
209. See Robert Teplitz, Note, Taking Assassination Attempts Seriously: Did the United
States Violate International Law in Forcefully Responding to the Iraqi Plot to Kill George
Bush?, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 569, 594 (1995) (describing incident, evidence pointing to
Iraqi involvement and U.S. response).
210. See id. at 603.
211. See Stephen Kinzer, Raid on Iraq: In Turkey: For Ankara, A Chance to Hit Kurd-
ish Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1996, at Sec. 1, p. 6 (describing Turkish incursions);
Stephen Meyers, Kurds Allied with Iraq Regain Ground, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1996, at Sec.
1, p. 5 (describing Allied response).
212. See Meyers, supra note 211.
213. Some believe inopportune statements by the U.S. and other allies led Iraq to con-
clude that cooperation was futile: American President George Bush and his successor,
President Bill Clinton, both stated that they would vote against the repeal of sanctions unless
and until Saddam Hussein was removed from power, thus removing any incentive on
Hussein's part to cooperate. See Craig Whitney, France Warns Iraq to Yield on Arms, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 31, 1998, at A6 (reporting French and Russian officials arguments that
"American implacability" was "driving" Saddam Hussein to defy the U.N. sanctions re-
gime).
214. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 183, T 8; see also Barbara Crossette, Iraqis Still Defying
Arms Ban, Departing U.N. Official Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1997, at At (reporting retir-
ing UNSCOM chief as claiming the Iraqis "refused to operate in good faith").
215. See Whitney, supra note 213 (reporting increasing disagreement about the appro-
priate means to ensure Iraq's compliance); Steven Erlanger, Russia and U.S. Split over
Dealing with Iraq; Moscow Urges More Patience, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1998, at A6 (noting
Russian and Chinese disagreement with American threats to use force). Some American
officials have argued that financial concerns and international political gamesmanship ex-
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frustrated at the erosion of support, made explicit its intention to act
unilaterally in its own national security interests.216 Late in 1998, fol-
lowing what appears to be the termination of all Iraqi cooperation with
the weapons inspection regime, the U.S. and Britain bombarded Iraqi
military installations for a period of four days. Beginning in 1999 Iraq
has persistently challenged American and British patrols of the "no-fly"
zones, leading to repeated targeting and destruction of military, com-
munication, and other installations in Iraq by the challenged fighter jets.
Civilians have been killed, injured, and indirectly harmed by damage
done to the oil delivery system used to generate funds for humanitarian
aid within Iraq. Applying the same standards identified with regard to
the Phase I and Phase II, these actions appear to present a factual basis
for Iraq to allege aggression and war crimes violations.
United States Action in the Balkans
Some trace the origins of the Bosnian conflict to the assassination of
the heir to Austria-Hungary's throne, Archduke Francis-Ferdinand in
Sarajevo in 1914,17 the event recognized as providing the spark for
World War I. The modem catalyst for the conflict in Bosnia may be
identified as the death of Communist Yugoslavia leader Marshall Tito
and the resurgent nationalistic and ethnic pressures which resulted from
the sudden liberalization of Yugoslavian society."8 In any event, while
the attention of the international community was focused on Iraq's inva-
sion of Kuwait, an equally serious crisis was developing in Yugoslavia.
The former Yugoslavia, by popular vote, fractured into the republics of
Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Serbia.2 9 The
split was encouraged by a number of factors ranging from political (four
of the five republics elected democratic governing structures, while one,
Serbia, elected to retain its communist identity) to ethnic and religious
(suddenly remembered were old hatreds between Slavic Muslims,
Croatians and ethnic Serbs) to opportunistic nationalism (Croatia and
plain the fracture within the Security Council. A potentially equally compelling justification
is the continuing harm suffered by Iraq's civilian population, already hurt by the sanctions
and previous military actions.
216. See generally CBS News Special Report: President Bill Clinton Explains the U.S.
Plan of Action for Dealing with Iraq (television broadcast, Feb. 17, 1998), available in
Lexis, News Lib., Transcript File (describing American interests in the Gulf War).
217. See BURNS WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 3 (3d ed.
1997); NORMAN DAVIES, EUROPE: A HISTORY 875-79 (1996).
218. See Christopher Goebel, Population Transfer, Humanitarian Law, and the Use of
Ground Forces in U.N. Peacemaking: Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Wake of Iraq, 25
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 627, 629-60 (1993) (describing the events in Bosnia and the U.N.
response).
219. See WESTON ET AL., supra note 217, at 3-4.
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Serbia secretly planned to split the Bosnian territory between them).22°
International recognition of the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina in
the face of fierce opposition by Serbians living within Bosnia as well as
in Croatia and Serbia was enough to launch hostilities: Bosnian Serb
militias, armed and assisted primarily by the Serb Republic, began a
campaign intended to create a "greater Serbia," laying siege to the
capital city of Sarajevo. 2 1
The international community was immediately involved in the dis-
pute: as the situation deteriorated, U.N. peacekeepers and observers
were deployed to Bosnia,222 humanitarian assistance was intermittently
provided,223 and the Security Council passed a resolution prohibiting
U.N. members from providing arms to the warring factions.2  In order
to limit the devastation, U.N.-sponsored "no-fly zones" were established
in Bosnia, although they were never actively enforced. 225 Because of the
former Yugoslavia's proximity to western European countries (and no
doubt recalling the devastating consequences of the Ferdinand assassi-
nation in Sarajevo in 1914) the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
("NATO") also actively sought to defuse the situation.2 6 Notwithstand-
ing these efforts, the situation deteriorated. War crimes, genocidal acts,
and crimes against humanity were perpetrated by all sides, but signifi-
cantly by Serbians against Muslims. The catalogue of crimes included
ethnic cleansing, mass murder, expulsions, rapes, assaults, and forced
pregnancies.
In 1995, after several failed attempts, a peace accord was negotiated
in the American city of Dayton, Ohio. The Dayton Peace Accords an-
ticipated a large deployment of NATO forces. American participation in
this effort continues to this day, with 6,000-11,000 American soldiers
deployed there as a part of a multinational force of averaging 33,000.227
220. See id.
221. See Goebel, supra note 218, at 629-32.
222. The U.N. forces were intended to stabilize the area in order to facilitate a peaceful
settlement of the dispute. See Matua, supra note 27, at 173.
223. In response to the humanitarian calamity, the U.N. cordoned areas of Bosnia and
designated them as "safe havens," to be free from attack and free to receive humanitarian
assistance. More than one "safe haven" was abandoned by the U.N. in the face of Bosnian
Serb military advancements.
224. See S.C. Res. 713, U.N. Doc. S/RES/713 (Sept. 25, 1991) (imposing embargo);
S.C. Res. 724, U.N. Doc. S/RES/724 (Dec. 15, 1991) (reaffirming embargo).
225. See McIlmail, supra note 203, at 37-48.
226. Resort to NATO authority was also justified by some as providing a less politi-
cized alternative to the U.N. Security Council, where close Russia-Serbian ties sometimes
stymied Security Council initiatives.
227. See General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign
Relations, U.S. Senate: Bosnia Peace Operation: Mission, Structure, and Transition Strategy
of NATO's Stabilization Force, GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation (Oct. 8 1998),
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Although the United Nations subsequently approved these arrange-
ments, American participation in the Bosnia peacekeeping force is in
response to NATO and not U.N. responsibilities. The deployment of
American troops in the Bosnian territory would present a prima facie
case of aggression under the objective definition adopted for the pur-
poses of this analysis, 229 except the agreement of the Bosnian
government to the deployment of the troops obviates the element of in-
tent required by Option 2, which requires the action be intended to
violate the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of
the state.23°
However, another circumstance arising from the Balkan conflict
may give rise to liability. Most recently Serbia has acted against its dis-
sident ethnic Albanian minority community in the Serbian province of
Kosovo. Reliable eye-witness reports confirm that government troops,
apparently acting upon orders, have massacred whole villages, including
children. Again it was NATO which acted, threatening to use force in
the form of air-strikes if Serbian forces did not withdraw;23' the NATO
Secretary-General has concluded that it has authority to act with relation
to Kosovo under the Dayton accords.232 In subsequent resolutions, the
U.N. Security Council has endorsed this action.
233
While no air-strikes have occurred, the threat is being maintained in
order to ensure protection of Serbia's Albanian communities as Serbian
and Albanian negotiators attempt to reach a long-term compromise.
available at <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov> [hereinafter GAO Report] (noting fluctua-
tions in force deployed according to temporary needs such as election monitoring).
228. See generally History of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (Nov. 16, 1998) (visited Nov. 21, 1998) <http://www.nato.int/sfor/docu/
d9811116.htm>.
229. See supra notes 257-60 and accompanying text.
230. Potential changes in the political situation in Bosnia might give rise to a valid
claim of aggression. For example, the collapse of the delicate political coalition might lead to
the installation of a government hostile to the deployment of NATO troops. If that were to
happen, and the NATO forces refused to withdraw when asked, that refusal might constitute
intentional interference with the sovereignty of the Bosnian government. Under those condi-
tions, the analysis would be largely similar to that arising from a complaint by Iraq to the
Phase II operations of the Gulf conflict.
231. See Mike O'Connor, Kosovo's Albanians Give Truce Pact Poor Reviews, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 15, 1998, at A6 (describing incidents and reaction).
232. See GAO Report, supra note 200, at 8; see also Press Statement by the North At-
lantic Council on Kosovo, Press Release (98)130 (Nov. 19, 1998), available in
<http://www.nato.int/doculpr/l1998/p98-130e.htm> (describing the "arrangements being put
into place by NATO... for verification of compliance with the relevant U.N. Security
Council resolutions").
233. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 199 (Sept. 23, 1998) (welcoming and
endorsing NATO sponsored agreement); S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (Oct. 24,
1998).
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Serbia could assert a prima facie claim that the threatened air-strikes
and deployment of NATO forces (with or without Security Council
authorization) in its territory constitute aggression.
United States Air-Strike in Sudan
On August 7, 1998, virtually simultaneous car bombs were deto-
nated at the U.S. embassies located in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania. Because of the location of these facilities in densely
populated areas235 the casualties were high: in Kenya thousands were
injured, including over 150 fatalities; in Tanzania over eighty were in-
jured, including over a dozen fatalities.236 The vast majority of the
casualties were African citizens.237 The international community con-
demned the bombings,238 and the United States government variously
promised action to retaliate, to bring those responsible to justice, and to
defend itself from future attacks. Identified as the mastermind of the
attacks was Saudi dissident turned terrorist, Osama bin Laden.239 bin
Laden had lived in Sudan before he was expelled by that country at the
United States' request. bin Laden then moved his operations to Afghani-
stan where he had assumed control of the training camps built by the
American government to train Afghanistan's resistance during the So-
viet occupation, using them as a training camps in the war against the
United States. Afghanistan, still wracked by civil war, had no govern-
ment with the power or political will to expel bin Laden.
234. While the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia initialed the Dayton Peace Accord, the
accord, by its terms, only contemplated the deployment of NATO forces within the Bosnian
territory, and cannot, therefore, be construed as an agreement by Serbia for NATO action in
Serbian territory. In the U.N. and NATO agreements regarding Kosovo, the Yugoslav gov-
ernment only agreed to permit the NATO deployment of observers, not enforcers, in Kosovo.
235. For security reasons, new American embassies are isolated, and have extensive
protective features which these older facilities did not have. See James Risen, Bombings in
East Africa: Bombed Embassies Did Not Meet Toughened Security Standards, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 8, 1998, at Al (noting that the Kenyan embassy was scheduled for rehabilitation and
security improvement in 1999).
236. Tim Weiner, Bombings in East Africa: The Investigation; Reward is Offered and
Clues Studied in African Blasts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1998 at AI (describing investigation).
237. Id.
238. See Bombings in East Africa: The Reaction; Around the World, Leaders Express
Outrage, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1988, at A8 (collecting statements of outrage by various lead-
ers).
239. Ironically, bin Laden is a creation of the United States. During the Soviet occupa-
tion of Afghanistan, bin Laden and many others like him were recruited and trained by the
U.S. to fight the Soviets. After the Soviets withdrew, leaving chaos behind in Afghanistan,
many were angered by the manipulation of Afghanistan by these outside forces; a fiercely
anti-American terrorist organization was created. See James Risen, Militant Leader Was a
U.S. Target Since the Spring, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1998, at Sec. 1, p. 1 (describing bin
Laden's history with the U.S. and the development of his anti-American philosophy).
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On August 20, ten days after the embassy bombings, the United
States launched surprise air-strikes aimed at the training camps in Af-
ghanistan, claiming the move was in self-defense. 42 Also targeted was
a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, Sudan, which was first identified
by the U.S. as a heavily guarded secret chemical weapons facility
owned by bin Laden and engaged in producing chemical weapons for
Iraq. 24' Ten were reported injured in the attack; there were no reported
fatalities. Since the attack, Sudan has maintained that the plant had no
ties to bin Laden and was not involved in the manufacture of chemical
weapons, but rather of needed pharmaceutical products.2" It has invited
scores of foreign diplomats to tour the plant and has unsuccessfully
called for an U.N.-sponsored international inspection of the facilities
and investigation of the attack.245 While retreating from some of its fac-
tual assertions and qualifying others, the U.S. continues to maintain that
the attack was warranted as legitimate self-defense.)4
240. Some critics argue that the timing of the bombing is related to the intensified in-
vestigation of American President Bill Clinton's affair with a young intern, Monica
Lewinsky. See Jane Perlez, Unhappy as a 'Paraiah' Sudanese Say U.S. Picked the Wrong
Target, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 23, 1998, at Al I (reporting Sudanese protest banners reading "No
War for Monica").
241. The surprise was necessary to ensure the ultimate objective: the death of bin
Laden, who was apparently thought to be in the camps when the air-strikes were launched.
Secrecy was assisted by the decision to launch the missiles from ships located in interna-
tional waters. No warning was given to Pakistan, even though the missiles aimed at
Afghanistan crossed Pakistani territory. Barton Gellman, U.S. Strikes Terrorist-Link Sites in
Afghanistan, Factory in Sudan, WASH. POST., Aug. 21, 1988, at Al (discussing the secrecy
and method of attack).
242. See id.; see also Steven Meyers, After the Attacks: U.S. Says Raids Worked and
may Stall Terror Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1998, at Al (reporting U.S. officials as in-
voking Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, regarding self-defense).
243. See Meyers, supra note 238.
244. Id. (reporting Sudan's denials of any connection between the plant and bin Laden
or chemical weapons production).
245. See id.; Barbara Crossette et al, U.S. Says Iraq Aided Production of Chemical
Weapons in Sudan, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1988 at Al(reporting U.S. efforts to put off a re-
quest for a Security Council investigation submitted to the Council by Kuwait on Sudan's
behalf).
246. American intelligence was remarkably incomplete. The government admitted that
it did not know the plant was a legitimate pharmaceutical operation (it produced up to fifty
percent of Sudanese pharmaceuticals) until three days after the attack. See Crossette et al.,
supra note 241, at Al. The original information linking bin Laden to the plant was found to
have been erroneous, although "new and not fully evaluated" information might yet prove an
indirect financial link. Tim Weiner, Pentagon & C.LA. Defend Sudan Missile Attack, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 1998, at A5. The significance of its finding of traces of Empta, a precursor of
VX, in a soil sample clandestinely obtained from the plant, has also been disputed. Chemical
weapons experts noted that if a sample is not carefully preserved and promptly tested, it can
result in misidentification, made more likely by the fact that the compound Empta is chemi-
cally similar to certain herbicides and pesticides. See Tim Weiner & Steve Myers, Flaws in
U.S. Account Raises Questions on Strike in Sudan, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1998, at Al (also
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Sudan could obviously present evidence of prima facie aggression
on the part of the United States forces involved in the attack.2 7 Sudan
could also argue that the decision to target a facility in a residential
neighborhood constitutes either a crime against humanity or a war
crime. These charges may be further augmented by the United States'
insistence that the facility was indeed a chemical weapons plant; if so,
the decision to target the facility, notwithstanding the risk of releasing
toxins into the surrounding neighborhood may provide an independent
basis for indictment on these grounds.248
Under the scenario suggested by the U.S. State Department, Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein, Serbian President Milosovic, and the Suda-
nese government would all present the Court's Prosecutor with charges
of aggression and war crimes violations against United States officials
and servicemen. The assertion of these claims would not be in good
faith; rather, these leaders seek to gain political advantage, either by
taking on the United States government, an institution hated by their
constituencies, or by deflecting attention from their own violations of
international humanitarian and human rights norms. What result?
reporting observations by a British engineer who worked at plant from 1992-96; he stated
that the plant did not have facilities that would permit safe handling of chemical weapons).
Even in the days immediately following the attack, before the deficiencies in the U.S.
evidence were revealed, most understood the action to be retaliatory and not defensive in
nature. See, e.g., Serge Schmemann, U.S. Fury on 2 Continents, How Can Terror Best Be
Combated, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1998, at AlIl (quoting governance scholars and military
experts as viewing the attack as retaliatory in nature: "Even if its revenge, it's meant to send
a message that there will be a retaliation, and that is deterrence").
247. Taliban, the extremist group which is now the putative governing structure of Af-
ghanistan, has offered varying responses to the attack, at times reporting almost happily that
bin Laden had survived the attack, and at others offering to cooperate with American efforts
to arrest him. See Colin Lynch, Taliban Hoping for a Way to Bid Adieu to Bin Laden, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Oct. 21, 1998, at Al. Because of the reluctance of the international community
to recognize Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, these offers have been
ignored. Taliban's questionable status may render it incapable of joining the Statute and of
raising these claims using the jurisdictional bases reserved for states. The Prosecutor's
propio motu powers would permit it to consider claims of aggression, which would be indis-
tinguishable from the claims that the Sudanese government could assert under the
circumstances. However, any analysis of either crimes against humanity or war crimes li-
ability would have to take into account the undeniably military character of the targets, in
contrast to the contested character of the pharmaceutical plant in Sudan.
248. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Evaluation of an Attack on a Chem/Bio Facility 4
(unpublished manuscript on file with author) (the destruction of a facility making such
weapons may be illegal "because of the possibility of causing extensive harm to nearby non-
combatants"). The U.S. attack was not deterred by the possibility that, should the pharma-
ceutical plant truly prove to be a chemical weapons facility, damage to the civilian casualties
might result from toxins released in the air by the attack. While acknowledging the risk, the
administration relied on the weapons selected, chosen because they would cause the building
to collapse on itself, to prevent a wide release of toxins. See Steven Meyers, U.S. Offers
More Details on Attack in the Sudan, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 24, 1998, at A6.
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Applying the Statute to American Action
The Automatic Statutory Protections
Before launching a full-scale investigation, the Prosecutor would
have to demonstrate that the decision to proceed with an investigation as
comporting with the requirements of the Statute, that is to say that there
exists "a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction
of the Court has been ... committed;" that the case is otherwise admis-
sible-which requires an assessment that the crime alleged is
"sufficiently grave;" and that furthermore, proceeding will be "in the
interests of justice. 24 9 In the scenarios described above based on these
restrictions, if the Prosecutor concurred with an American assessment
that the claims had no legal foundation, but rather were brought in bad
faith for purely political motives, the Prosecutor should terminate the
proceedings on her own initiative.
As a preliminary matter, notwithstanding the complementary juris-
diction provisions in the Statute, it is likely that the U.S. would have to
rely on the gatekeeping functions of the Prosecutor, instead of taking a
more proactive role to protect itself from frivolous, political charges.
The United States could undertake a rigorous investigation of the
charges itself, thereby seeking to preempt Court action through the ex-
ercise of its complementary jurisdiction.25° However, if interpreted
strictly, the shield of complementary jurisdiction may prove thin: a per-
suasive challenge to the impartiality of American domestic proceedings
could be made, especially as it pertains to charges alleging the crime of
aggression.25' First, in the American military justice system, while def-
erence to superiors may be inappropriate in the conduct of war, jus in
bello, the command structure's determinations of when to take military
action, jus ad bello, are intended to be respected.252 In the American do-
mestic court system similar deference is achieved through the
application of the political question doctrine, a judicial constitutional
249. See supra Part I.E. (describing the duties of the Prosecutor).
250. See supra Part I.D. (describing complementary jurisdiction provisions).
251. See Gallant, supra note 133 (arguing that for most states the exercise of comple-
mentary jurisdiction might be inappropriate).
252. See CHRISTOPHER, supra note 9, at 157.
We must take care that we do not too hastily extend our conclusions concerning a
soldier's obligation to disobey orders he or she believes to be immoral underjus in
bello, with his or herjus ad bellum responsibility to carry out the political will of
the nation the soldier represents. Determining when a nation ought to resort to the
use of force is a difficult matter involving human judgments and political proc-
esses.
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construct which requires the courts to respect the decisions of the politi-
cal branches with regard to matters peculiarly reserved to them,
including certain foreign relations, military, and security issues.253 Ac-
cordingly, the Criminal Court might fairly conclude it is always
inappropriate to defer to complementary jurisdiction as exercised either
by American military or domestic courts in cases where they are asked
to judge the crime of aggression, which involves the very "political"
decision to wage war.
The American track record on judging whether the actions of its
military in combat settings constitute war crimes or crimes against hu-
manity does not inspire confidence in its impartiality and fairness.
American courts have demonstrated willingness to defer to military
judgment on matters implicating security. Thus in 1944 the United
States Supreme Court upheld the military exclusion orders establishing
Japanese internment camps, and in the 1970s countless challenges to the
Vietnam War were rebuffed.254 Although it has in the past prosecuted
individual soldiers for their illegal acts,255 the U.S. military, acting on
cues provided by the administration, seems equally unable or unwilling
to question its own policies which arguably result in war crimes. On
countless occasions it has stated its refusal to even investigate instances
when military action has resulted in massive casualties or has otherwise
been demonstrated as inappropriate, including the bombing of the
Amariyah air-raid shelter and the selection of the Sudanese pharmaceu-
tical plant as a valid military target.
2
1
6
253. See generally THOMAS FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS, JUDICIAL ANSWERS (1992)
(discussing limitations of doctrine's application).
254. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (noting "military authorities
[are] charged with the primary responsibilities of defending our shores" and affording defer-
ence to those decisions); see generally TAYLOR, supra note 10 (describing rejection of
arguments of illegal aggression made by conscientious objectors with regard to the Vietnam
conflict).
255. See, e.g., United States v. Calley, 22 C.M.A. 534, 48 C.M.R. 19 (1973)
(prosecution relating to the My Lai massacre).
256. See Patrick Tyler, War in the Gulf: Strategy; U.S. Stands Firm on Bomb Attack
and Says Investigation Is Closed, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1991, at Al (reporting that adminis-
trative and military officials "were closing the books on the [Amariyah] attack without
further investigation"); NEEDLESS DEATHS, supra note 186, at 145-47 (criticizing the deci-
sion to close Amariyah investigation); Meyers, supra note 238 (reporting officials rebuffing
suggestions on further investigation into Sudan attack); cf. Report of U.S. Department of
Defense, Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Downing of Iran Air
Flight 655 on July 3, 1988 (recommending no reprimands or charges be brought against
soldiers responsible for shooting down civilian aircraft notwithstanding acknowledged defi-
ciencies in the performance). Over forty years after the event the planned inclusion in a
recent exhibit of language suggesting the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not
justified by military necessity led to protests by active and retired military personnel;
high-ranking legislators effected the removal of the "offending" language from the dis-
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Given these legal, structural, and political limitations, notwith-
standing the integrity of the American military and civilian judicial
systems, complementary jurisdiction over charges of aggression or war
crimes violations might be precluded on legal and fairness grounds. If
so, of the automatic protections anticipated by the Statute, only the well-
considered discretion of the Prosecutor would prevent a full investiga-
tion and any further appropriate proceedings pertaining to charges
brought against the United States.
The Crime of Aggression
For the purposes of this analysis, a modified version of the second
optional proposed definition will be applied to each of the incidents.
Because of its detail, and its reliance on an objective characterization of
war crimes, Option 2 provides the most guidance for this endeavor.
Further, because of its strong similarity to General Assembly Resolution
3314, this option is most likely to have broad support of the likely con-
stituents of the Court. The relevant portions are as follows:
Option 2
1. For the purposes of this Statute, the crime of aggression is
committed by a person who is in a position of exercising
control or capable of directing... political actions in his
State, against another State, in contravention to the Charter
of the United Nations, by resorting to armed force, to
threaten or violate the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
political independence of that State.
2. Acts constituting aggression include the following:258
play. See The Library, The Enola Gay Controversy (visited Nov. 7, 1998) <http://
www.exploratorium.edu/nagasaki/Library/enola.html> (describing the changes in the dis-
play). See generally NEEDLESS DEATHS, supra note 186 (discussing possible liability arising
from honest but mistaken belief of military character); David Linnan, Iran Air Flight 655
and beyond: Free Passage, Mistaken Self-Defense and State Responsibility, 16 YALE J.
INT'L L. 245 (1991).
257. Each of the other two options might require Security Council approval before the
court could proceed with a prosecution based on charges of aggression. The political nature
of Council action thus prevents any meaningful analysis relying on these options.
258. This entire paragraph is bracketed for possible exclusion from the definition. The
version adopted for the purposes of this analysis will include the language, which adopts the
non-exclusive list of examples of aggressive acts first enumerated in General Assembly
Resolution 3314. This version omits the following qualifying language as redundant:
"Provided that the acts concerned or their consequences are of sufficient gravity." See ROME
STATUTE art. 17 (providing lack of "sufficient gravity" as a reason to find the case inadmis-
sible).
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(a) the invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the
territory of another State, or any military occupation, how-
ever temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or
any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another
State or part thereof;
(b) bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the ter-
ritory of another State;259 [or]...
(d) an attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or
air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State.
In considering the charges of aggression outlined above, several or-
ganizing themes have been rejected in favor of grouping the charges
according to the justification for the use of force. This scheme seems
appropriate in light of the U.S. objections in that its focus is the validity
of the claims: the more compelling the American justification for the
resort to force, the less compelling the charges of aggression and the
more likely the objection that the Court is being subverted to advance a
purely political agenda. Accordingly, the military actions outlined above
will be considered in two groups: those for which the U.S. has relied on
self-defense or collective self-defense as a basis for action (Iraq Phases
I & III, and Sudan), and those where the American government acts to
provide humanitarian assistance (Iraq Phase II, and Bosnia).
A. Circumstances of Self-Defense
Well-settled principles of public international law require nations to
respect the political and territorial integrity of other states; indeed re-
spect for the sovereignty and political independence of states is
incorporated into the Statute's definition of aggression.26' Military ac-
tion taken in contravention of that basic principle may constitute
aggression.262 However, under public international law, as incorporated
into the Statute, a charge of aggression is negated by a valid claim of
self-defense.6 Thus, although the Phase I military action, which in-
cluded the bombardment and invasion of Iraq, presents a prima facie
259. Omitted is the following: "or the use of any weapons by a State against the terri-
tory of another State." Draft Statute, supra note 88.
260. The provisions of paragraphs (c), (e)-(g) are omitted as not relevant to this analy-
sis.
261. See Option 2 of Appendix A.
262. Id.
263. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inher-
ent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member
of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measure necessary to main-
tain international peace and security.").
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violation of Iraq's political and territorial integrity, Iraqi claims of
American aggression would be negated by the valid claim of self-
defense. In this circumstance the United States' announced purpose was
to participate in an exercise of collective self-defense at the behest of
Kuwait; 64 in this it garnered the support of the Security Council, and
indeed, most of the international community.265
According to the terms of the Statute, the approval or disapproval of
the Security Council is not conclusive: an independent analysis by the
Prosecutor (and later by the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers), is nonethe-
less required to determine if the actions complained of fall under the
jurisdiction of the Statute. 66 In this circumstance, there is little need for
a preliminary investigation, let alone a full investigation: the basic fac-
tual scenario is "open and notorious," permitting immediate preliminary
review by the Prosecutor. The Prosecutor, taking into account Iraq's
own aggression, may determine that in light of the doctrine of self-
defense (here collective self-defense) "there is no reasonable basis to
believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been com-
mitted. 2 67 Alternatively, the Prosecutor may determine that there are
"substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the
interests of justice" (based on Iraq's own bad action).2 68 Either determi-
nation would end the proceedings before a full investigation.
2 69
264. In this regard the U.S. involvement in Kuwait differs from its involvement in
Nicaragua, where, the World Court held, there was no credible evidence that any of Nicara-
gua's neighbors had even asked for help. See Nicaragua Case, 1986 I.C.J. at 14.
265. See S.C. Res. 661, supra note 173; see also S.C. Res. 678, supra note 178
(authorizing the use of force to restore international peace and security).
266. In this instance the approval of the Security Council might be of questionable pro-
bative value. In legal academia there was considerable debate about whether the Security
Council had the authority to act in all of the ways that it did, and further whether it imper-
missibly deviated from the process set forth in the Charter under Chapter VII. See, e.g.,
Burns Weston, Security Council Resolutions 678 and Persian Gulf Decisionmaking: Pre-
carious Legitimacy, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 516, 518 (1991) (remarking that the Council's
actions "raise" exceedingly troublesome questions about whether the Council acted in con-
formity with the Charter); cf John Quigley, The "Privatization" of Security Council
Enforcement Action: A Threat to Multilateralism, 17 MICH. J. INT'L 249, 250-61 (1996)
(describing certain Council action as falling outside the Charter and thus compromising the
integrity of the process); Frederic Kirgis, The United Nations at Fifty: The Security Council's
First Fifty Years, 89 AM J. INT'L L. 506, 529-32, 536-37 (1995) (questioning Council action
toward Iraq); but see Fernando Trson, Collective Humanitarian Intervention, 17 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 323 (1996) (arguing the action was legitimate).
267. ROME STATUTE art. 53(1)(a); see also supra Part I.E.
268. ROME STATUTE art. 53(1)(c); see also supra Part I.E. While the explanation of
"interests of justice" does not expressly provide for application of the doctrine of "unclean
hands," it might be considered a "circumstance" of which note is properly taken.
269. One possible legal argument might convince the Prosecutor to proceed. The day
before the Security Council's deadline for withdrawal, Iraq agreed to pull out from Kuwait;
this offer was rejected-unless Iraq left behind all of its heavy weaponry. Iraq could argue
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Iraq presents a more sympathetic case with respect to Phase III of
the Iraqi conflict. In those circumstances the United States has invoked
self-defense to justify a number of military actions taken which present
prima facie instances of aggression, including attacking hostile aircraft
and anti-aircraft installations violating the "no-fly zones," as well as
Baghdad in self-defense of an alleged foiled assassination attempt on
George Bush.27° Here the factual circumstances are not open and notori-
ous; the validity of all claims of self-defense with regard to perceived
targeting by Iraqi anti-aircraft weaponry is dependent solely upon U.S.
sources.27 ' The June 1993 claim of self-defense depends upon allega-
tions concerning an assassination plot that Iraq has denied, and for
which the primary source of information is Kuwait, arguably a biased
source. Thus there is no agreed set of facts nor an open and notorious
record available for review from which a Prosecutor might conclude
either that "there is no reasonable basis to believe that a crime within
the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed," or that further pro-
ceedings would be contrary to "interests of justice."
In this way the air-strikes against Sudan and the Phase III opera-
tions are indistinguishable; in each instance the air-strikes are prima
facie instances of aggression, 72 and the claim of self-defense cannot be
assessed against an objective factual background. The information that
the Khartoum plant was connected to bin Laden or in any way involved
in chemical weapons production is disputed;273 at the very least it ap-
pears that a preliminary investigation would be required to enable the
Prosecutor to determine whether the justification of self-defense is ap-
propriately asserted and that consequently no crime under the Court's
jurisdiction has been committed.
that this proffer ended its aggression and thereby forecloses reliance on the justification of
self-defense.
270. See Option 2 of Appendix A, I 2(a), (b) & (d).
271. For example, the U.S. claim that anti-aircraft installations targeted U.S. warplanes
is unverifiable by independent sources.
272. See Option 2 of Appendix A, I 2(b).
273. While the circumstances of the embassy bombings have been investigated by a
number of governments, and the basic facts known to all, the purported link between Sudan
and the embassy bombings or any other current terrorist activity is based on information
collected by and known only to the United States, which it refuses to disclose except in the
most general terms. Nor does the U.S. assertion that a soil sample tested positively for
chemical weapons components resolve the dispute; the U.S. refuses fully to disclose the
circumstances of the sample's collection, and has further refused to release the sample for
independent testing. Sudan's past links to terrorist organizations, including that of Osama
bin Laden, do not advance the inquiry. Indeed, Sudan, at the United States' request, had
expelled bin Laden, and thus appears to have moved away from its previous support of ter-
rorism.
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In both cases, as troubling as the deficiencies in the factual record
may be, the legal complexities of the case are perhaps even more prob-
lematic. None of these claims of self-defense present "classic" claims of
self-defense, which "is subject to the State concerned having been the
victim of an armed attack, '2 74 and typically requires that the attack trig-
gering the claim of self-defense occurred on the territory, forces or
against the nationals of the state.275 With regard to Iraq, the "attacks"
were the targeting of U.S. aircraft patrolling the contested "no-fly" zone
and a foiled assassination attempt."' In the case of Sudan there was an
attack-but it was not perpetrated by Sudan. While the claims of self-
defense are consistent with past American practice, the international
community has yet to speak to the validity of claiming self-defense in
circumstances such as these. 278 Thus, important questions are presented
by these circumstances even assuming arguendo the validity of the
American version of the facts.
Is the targeting of weapons, without firing them, an armed attack
triggering the right of self defense 7 9 Is armed force an appropriate re-
sponse to covert activity in the form of an assassination attempt?. ° If so,
does the justification extend to attempts on the lives of former heads of
274. See Nicaragua Case, 1986 I.C.J. at 14, 193-195 (also acknowledging principles
of collective self-defense).
275. For these purposes, the embassies, aircraft and vessels of a state are usually con-
sidered part of its "territory" triggering the right to self-defense.
276. With regard to the incidents in the "no-fly zones," a preliminary question is the
validity of the U.S. patrols, which in themselves present a prima facie case of aggression. If
the United States presence in Iraq is itself unlawful, then Iraq's targeting of the aircraft
would be permissible self-defense, and the U.S. action in shooting down aircraft and target-
ing anti-aircraft facilities illegal.
277. See supra note 19 (describing U.S. operations actions in Grenada and other places
and law review articles critiquing claims of self-defense).
278. The scenario is further complicated by American reliance on suspected Iraqi con-
nections to the plant in Sudan-could that link serve as justification for an attack on another
country?
279. International law recognizes the right of preemptive action, but the reasonableness
of the use of armed force will depend upon the circumstances. See Nicaragua Case, 1986
I.C.J. at 14; see also Bassiouni, supra note 244. In this case an important circumstance to be
considered would be the legality of the no-fly zones themselves. See infra notes Part lI.B.
280. The answer suggested by the Nicaragua Case is that assassinations, like other
covert activity, may give rise to a legitimate claim of self-defense. See Nicaragua Case,
1986 I.C.J. 195 (quoting General Assembly Resolution 3314) (" 'the sending.. . of armed
bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another
State'" may constitute an armed attack giving rise to self-defense); see also Option 2 in
Appendix A, 2(g) (incorporating that definition into proposed definition of aggression);
Teplitz, Note, supra note 209, at 617 ("The U.S. missile attack on Baghdad was legal under
international law. The response satisfied the requirements for the legitimate use of force in
self-defense under customary international law, since the U.S. action was necessary, in re-
sponse to an imminent threat, proportionate, and taken after the exhaustion of peaceful
means.").
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state? If the assassination fails (that is to say there is no known current
threat), is the state whose national was targeted required to explore
means short of armed force in the absence of imminent danger? If it
does resort to the use of armed force, does it constitute self-defense or
retaliation? An equally troubling question is presented by the use of
armed force to combat terrorism. Here, the terrorist bombings occurred
in Kenya and Tanzania, and were perpetrated by aliens of diverse na-
tionalities. The attack constituting "self-defense" was aimed at a
country which was not involved in the attack, occurred ten days after the
original bombings, and was not in response to a known, imminent dan-
ger. The obvious question is therefore the appropriate selection of a
target for purposes of "defending" against terrorism. 8' All of these
questions have been the subject of considerable debate within the inter-
national community and academia;282 the applicable law is so unsettled
that a Prosecutor should find cause to proceed with an investigation, and
likely thereafter to recommend an indictment. 83
Accordingly, a contested factual record and troubling questions of
international law would likely mean that the United States would be
compelled to defend its nationals against crimes of aggression related to
its Phase III operations in Iraq and the bombing of Sudan.
However, the implications of this analysis undercut the American
objections that, because of its extensive participation in peacekeeping
missions, it will be subject to purely political charges of aggression. It is
precisely in instances where the United States uses armed force as part
of a sanctioned international peacekeeping mission predicated on col-
lective self-defense that it is not likely to be subjected to charges of
aggression because the international recognition of the need for the mis-
sion is likely to be predicated on an open and notorious instance of
recognized aggression on the part of the targeted (now complaining)
281. Notably, although Osama bin Laden, the suspected mastermind of the attack, is a
Saudi national, there was no question of attacking Saudi Arabia, even though the threat of
destruction of his extensive family holdings might be the only effective threat to quiet bin
Laden.
282. See, e.g., Robert Beck & Anthony Arend, "Don't Tread on Us": International
Law and Forcible State Responses to Terrorism, 12 Wis. INT'L L.J. 153 (1994) (describing
modem responses to international terrorism and evaluating their legality); Loch John, On
Drawing a Bright Line for Covert Operations, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 284 (1992) (considering
appropriate response to international terrorism); cf Lori Damrosch, The United States Con-
stitution in its Third Century: Foreign Affairs; Distribution of Constitutional Authority;
Cover Operations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 795 (1989) (discussing implications for American law
concerning presidential war powers).
283. The importance of these questions of international law would normally be ex-
pected to preclude a preliminary determination by a Prosecutor not to proceed to indictment;
however it might be that an investigation creates a compelling factual record which would
suggest that the "interests of justice" requires the matter be closed.
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state. Assuming responsible action by the Council in deciding to
authorize the use of armed force, the authority of the Council will not be
undermined by the Criminal Court, and states will not be discouraged
from participating in future peacekeeping missions. However, where the
United States unilaterally resorts to armed force on a questionable or
contested factual record, or in non-traditional responses to acts of ag-
gression against it, its actions may subject it to scrutiny by the
International Criminal Court.
That is not an undesirable result; if a state wants to use armed force
in a situation where it considers itself under attack, it will have a greater
incentive to seek the assistance of the United Nations.284 Even if the
United Nations does not concur with the state's assessment, a public
airing of the circumstances will provide a greater factual background
against which to judge the appropriateness of the claim of self-defense.
Indeed, a public airing might lead to reconciliation between the affected
states. In those instances where urgency or secrecy will not permit the
state to present the matter to the Security Council (or one of the regional
inter-governmental bodies) before the attack, the Criminal Court will
step in to provide a post-hoc evaluation of the circumstances. Notably,
if the Security Council concurs with the state's assessment that the tar-
geted state has acted aggressively and matters of international peace and
security are at stake, the Council can take action to delay the Court's
consideration of the matter. In conclusion, contrary to the assertion that
the Criminal Court will undermine the important role the U.N. and other
international governmental organizations play in maintaining interna-
tional peace and security, it would appear that the Court processes will
fulfill their intended goal of supporting and supplementing those func-
tions.
B. Providing Humanitarian Assistance
The examples of Iraq, Phase II, and Bosnia represent instances
when the use of armed force is justified by the desire to provide hu-
manitarian assistance or prevent human rights violations. In the case of
Iraq, it was the government's suppression of armed rebellion which in-
stigated the humanitarian crisis; in the case of Bosnia it was civil war,
and, later, the Serbian government's treatment of rebellious Albanian
communities which gave rise to the humanitarian crisis. Notwithstand-
ing the laudable goal to provide assistance, the use of armed force in
instances not constituting self-defense are prima facie aggression under
the objective standard used in this analysis because it "threaten[s] or
284. As is anticipated by article 51 of the Charter. See supra note 263.
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violate[s] the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence"
of the targeted state. Humanitarian action is not properly considered
self-defense because the state targeted for armed force has not directed
armed force at another state, constituting aggression, but has used force
internally, if at all.
The Statute does not address the issue of humanitarian intervention;
accordingly, any decision to recognize humanitarian purposes as a de-
fense to charges of aggression will have to be based on customary law.
Developing principles of international law recognize the appropriate-
ness of armed force to vindicate international human rights, but the
issue is not yet settled."' 5 Moreover, in those circumstances where hu-
manitarian intervention is warranted, scholars caution that a distinction
should be made between unilateral and collective intervention."6 Given
the unsettled nature of the question, a Prosecutor should be reluctant to
close a matter presenting these issues as not falling within the Court's
jurisdiction, not sufficiently grave to warrant consideration or otherwise
against the interests of justice. The United States, acting out of a stated
desire to help an oppressed population, might therefore find its nationals
haled before the Criminal Court.
However, the U.S. action would not be without defense, if it is act-
ing in cases involving the most serious humanitarian issue: genocide.
The Genocide Convention requires state parties to "call upon the com-
petent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the
Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate" in response
to genocide.287 In circumstances where the United States deployment of
force is in response to a Security Council resolution that a state is en-
gaging in genocide, it could argue that that authorization is a complete
defense to charges of aggression. In the case of Iraq's treatment of the
Kurds and Shiites, and the ethnic rivalry at issue in the Balkan crisis, a
claim of genocide could be easily supported by the facts.288 If ac-
285. See Tdson, supra note 266; MCCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 158, at 317-27.
The unsettled nature of the question was tacitly acknowledged by the Security Council.
While Resolution 688 "demanded" Iraq "contribute" to the international peace and security
of the region by ceasing its "repression" of its civilians and further "insisted" Iraq cooperate
with the Secretary-General's humanitarian relief efforts, it did not authorize the use of force
to achieve these goals.
286. See Tdson, supra note 266, at 336-38; see generally Jost Delbruck, Commentary
on International Law: A Fresh Look at Humanitarian Intervention under the Authority of the
United Nations, 67 IND. L.J. 887 (1992) (discussing post-cold war ascending of the U.N. and
possible implications regarding humanitarian law).
287. Genocide Convention, supra note 9, art. VIII.
288. These cases thus present extraordinary circumstances. It is not to be imagined (or
hoped) that instances of genocide will frequently arise or that the Council would lightly
charges states with engaging in genocide.
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cepted"' this defense would privilege Security Council determinations
about this, most grave, humanitarian issue. Even if the defense is re-
jected as a legal defense, the Prosecutor may, using the same flexible
approach outlined previously in applying the standards of admissibility,
refuse, in the "interests of justice," to pursue claims of aggression when
armed force is authorized by the Security Council in response to geno-
cide. What will be important to her consideration will be the fullness of
the factual record and the seriousness of the charges of genocide.
The implications of this are two-fold. First, as is noted by the previ-
ous analysis regarding claims of self-defense, states are encouraged to
rely on Security Council determinations that a state is engaging in geno-
cide and armed force is warranted, and would undertake unilateral
humanitarian operations at its own risk; this would suggest yet another
way that the Statute supports rather than undermines one important mis-
sion of the United Nations: to encourage states to first seek collective
rather than unilateral responses to international crises. Second, states
(and by implication, the Security Council) would be encouraged to re-
strict humanitarian intervention to the most serious circumstances. This
potential effect is more troubling in that it privileges the interests of
state sovereignty over the interests of swiftly acting to vindicate an im-
portant international rights norm. In this way the Statute reflects
tensions running though modern international law: to what extent may
possible violations of international human rights standards-including
genocide-permit intervention in violation of the principles of sover-
eignty?
For crises not amounting to genocide, or instances where the state
has acted unilaterally, the International Criminal Court will be the most
appropriate place to question whether the doctrine of jus ad bello has
developed to such an extent as to permit, on a broad variety of grounds,
humanitarian intervention. To the extent that the U.S. is peculiarly at
risk for charges of aggression in such circumstances, those charges can-
not be dismissed as "purely political" or "malicious" in nature. A
genuine question exists as to the state of the law. Moreover, to defini-
tively establish the legal principle that unilateral or collective action
to vindicate human rights is appropriate (or not), all that will be re-
quired is for a few cases presenting that issue to be decided in a
289. No provision of the Statute sets forth the exact relationship between the Statute
and other humanitarian conventions. The definition of war crimes acknowledges the Geneva
Conventions of 1949. See ROME STATUTE art. 8. Article 10 asserts, rather ambiguously, that
nothing in the definitions section "shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way
existing or developing rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute." Id. art.
10.
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thoughtful manner; 290 possible American participation in the process of
determining either what the law is or what the law should be cannot be
considered an unreasonable burden."' Finally, it would be especially
appropriate to require the United States-or any other state acting on its
on initiative for humanitarian purposes-to defend those actions in
some forum.292
Humanitarian and War Crimes Violations
As discussed previously, the applicable provisions of the war crimes
definition are (1) "intentionally directing attacks against the civilian
population;" and (2) "intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge
that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or
... which would clearly be excessive in relation to the concrete and di-
rect overall military advantage anticipated., 293 Similar prohibitions,
absent the requirement of proportionality, are found in the definition of
crimes against humanity.2 4 Thus the bombing of the Amariyah air-raid
shelter and the bombing of the suspected biological weapons plant in
Sudan together present common issues: the appropriateness of specific
targeting decisions in time of war or armed attack,295 and, more gener-
ally, the appropriateness of a bombardment campaign which knowingly
risks collateral civilian casualties. 296 Because of the virtual identity of
290. The issue of Security Council authority in such circumstances has been presented
to the International Court of Justice in the Bosnia-Herzegovina case, and to the Yugoslavia
Tribunal in the Tadic case. However, in the first matter the issue was avoided by the Court,
and in the second the authority of the Council to extend Chapter VII to internal matters pre-
senting humanitarian concerns was accepted by the Tribunal without meaningful analysis.
See generally Alvarez, supra note 141 (discussing the Tadic opinion).
291. Indeed, no matter in what forum the issue is raised, and whether or not the United
States is party to the case where the issue is being considered, one expects the United States
would want to participate in the development of these emerging norms. Notably the U.S. has
vigorously participated in cases to which the U.S. was not a party, when international secu-
rity interests were implicated. See, e.g., Tadic Case, supra note 141; Nuclear Weapons, 1996
I.C.J. at 36.
292. A powerful disincentive will screen out the most frivolous and politically moti-
vated charges of aggression. Presumably a charge would be deemed as such by the United
States if its intervention was in response to a severe violation of human rights standards. Yet
if a state has treated its citizens so badly, it will be less likely to bring the matter to the Inter-
national Criminal Court, where its own actions would be exposed and it might incur liability
for charges of genocide and crimes against humanity.
293. See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
294. See ROME STATUTE art. 7.
295. One could argue whether or not the U.S. bombing of Sudan was part of an inter-
national armed conflict (consistent with U.S. claims of self-defense) constituting an act of
war in its own right, or whether a reprisal or some other form of armed attack does not
amount to an international armed conflict.
296. In addition, the bombing of the Amariyah shelter standing alone, and the bombing
of Sudan present the issue of what steps must be taken to reduce the risk of civilian casual-
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the issues presented, the analysis which follows largely pertains to both
instances.
A. The Law of Mistake
The first question to be addressed is whether the U.S. would be li-
able for intentionally targeting civilian objects-in the case of the
Amariyah incident, a civilian air-raid shelter, and in the case of Sudan, a
civilian pharmaceutical plant. In each instance the U.S. relies on the
defense of mistake, that it in fact did not know the targets were civilian,
and it was reasonable in both instances to characterize the facilities as
either purely or predominantly military in nature.297 Under this reasoning
the U.S. would bear no criminal liability, either under humanitarian or
jus in bello provisions, for "intentionally directing an attack against the
civilian population.""2 8 The availability of the defense of mistake is
predicated on a factual inquiry into the genuineness of the mistake; the
law of war also imposes liability for reckless errors. 99 Here both the
genuineness and reasonableness of the error is asserted. Iraq maintains
that the shelter never had a military use, an assertion supported in part
by eye-witness accounts that dispute American claims that the structure
had been fortified for military use. Even if the U.S. believed the shelter
had some military purpose, the argument has also been made that its
knowledge of the past civilian use required the U.S. to vigorously in-
vestigate before attacking.3° Sudan similarly challenges the U.S. claims
by asserting that the pharmaceutical plant did not in fact participate in
the manufacture of chemical weapons. Sudan further asserts that the
evidence relied upon by the U.S. was so suspect and incomplete as to
render the classification of the plant as military reckless. Thus the first
step in any analysis must be an assessment of the factual predicates for
the U.S. action.
ties when a planned attack places civilians at a great risk of harm. See NEEDLESS DEATHS,
supra note 186 (outlining possible action the U.S. was required to take given its knowledge
that the shelter had been used by civilians); cf. DOD Iraq Report, supra note 54, at 626
(noting duties but claiming the law is "deficient" in this regard).
297. Strictly speaking, the U.S. actually continues to maintain that both targets were
military, refusing to "second-guess" their original assessment. See supra notes 191-94 and
240-46 and accompanying text.
298. Rome Statute art. 8(2)(b)(i).
299. For a thoughtful and thorough examination of the doctrine of mistake in the law of
war, see David Finnan, Iran Air Flight 655 and Beyond: Free Passage, Mistaken Self-
Defense and State Responsibility, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 245, 309-77 (1991) (surveying exam-
ples of mistaken self-defense asserted in a variety of contexts, including those resulting in
attacks on civilians). This analysis, although helpful, must be qualified by the fact that the
doctrine of mistake described therein carried no penal sanction.
300. See NEEDLESS DEATHS, supra note 186, at 137-38.
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If we were again to focus exclusively on gatekeeper responsibilities
of the Prosecutor, it is difficult to see how she would be able to con-
clude, from the factual record available, that no crime within the Court's
jurisdiction has been committed. The pertinent information is wholly in
the control of the United States, which has announced its intent in the
case of Iraq "to close the books" on the matter, and in the case of the
Sudan bombing to protect its confidential sources. Even assuming
American cooperation, an investigation to establish as much corrobora-
tion from independent sources might be both appropriate and necessary.
Under those circumstances it is difficult to see how the Prosecutor could
avoid initiating an investigation.
B. Targeting Strategies and Collateral Civilian Casualties
Bombardment campaigns are conducted pursuant to generally ac-
cepted military objectives. The interruption of the communications
capability of the enemy and the severance of the lines of supply and re-
inforcement are well-recognized military objectives.3 ' However, targets
which advance those goals are not open to attack without limitation;
when civilian casualties are likely, the risk to them must be weighed
against the net anticipated gain.3°2 Accordingly, although the fact that
valid military targets are located in population centers will not shield
those targets from attack, ordinarily less important targets should not be
attacked unless an unusually significant advantage will result.3 3 The
problems associated with making these necessary distinctions are exac-
erbated by the realties of modem society and modem warfare: "in any
modem society, many objects intended for civilian use may also be used
for military purposes. A bridge or highway vital to daily commuter and
business traffic can be equally crucial to military traffic or support for a
nations' war effort. '3 °4 In addition, the availability of more sophisticated
301. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text (describing general principles of
jus in bello); DOD Iraq Report, supra note 54, at 615-25; see also MCCOUBREY, supra note
11. For a description of the American military codes or rules of conduct which incorporate
these rules, see Normand & Jochnick, supra note 198.
302. See generally supra note 17 (regarding law of war); FRITS KALSHOVEN, RE-
STRAINTS OF THE WAGING OF WAR (1987) (describing the limitations contained in modem
conventions); GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE (1980) (describing the development
of humanitarian law).
303. See BEST, supra note 302, at 262-85 (describing the development of rules relating
to aerial warfare); DOD Iraq Report, supra note 54, at 624-25 (acknowledging rule as cus-
tomary law); MCCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 158.
304. DOD Iraq Report, supra note 54, at 623. Advances in technology also account for
the seemingly far-reaching search for military targets. Because Iraq's electrical power sys-
tem operates on a grid, a power plant in the northern reaches of the country could
conceivably contribute to the power supply used in Iraq's southern most regions; that was
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weaponry has had the deleterious effect of perhaps reducing the self-
restraint of nations at war. For example, during the Gulf War the
United States military asserted that civilian casualties would be mini-
mized by the use of "smart," laser-guided weapons."6 In fact, statistics
released after the war demonstrated a high incidence of error, with each
error representing possible civilian casualties. These and other tensions
and gaps in application have led the international community to take
steps to further develop the law of war.307 As a consequence, the law
addressing these issues is in a state of flux.
Under the war crimes provision, two related charges could arise
from these facts, first that the individual attacks were not justified by
military necessity. In other words, the U.S. wrongly targeted both the
shelter and the plant, given the information available and the knowledge
that civilian casualties would result for too little of a military gain. The
law in this area, as with charges of aggression arising from humanitarian
intervention, is not so developed as to present a clear indication of
whether the crime falls under the Statute.3 °8 As noted previously, the
Statutory definition of war crimes requires that the accused state has
engaged in "a plan or policy" to violate the law. On its face, this would
seem to permit the United States to argue that these unfortunate isolated
incidents do not constitute war crimes falling under the Court's juris-
diction. However, the Yugoslavia Tribunal has opened the door for
isolated incidents that are undertaken as part of a planned military ob-
jective to give rise to war crimes liability.
Assuming liability may attach for such an isolated incident, responsi-
bility would then turn on the doctrines of necessity and proportionality:
the military objective, the extent of the accused state's knowledge that the
target had a civilian character (past civilian use in the case of the shel-
ter, mixed civilian use in the case of the plant) and its intent to attack
sufficient in the eyes of the Coalition forces to render the power plant in the northern city of
Mosul a legitimate military target in the quest to liberate Kuwait.
305. According to Best, the increasing reliance on accuracy as a means of justifying re-
sort to aerial bombardment of cities began with the first military use of aircraft. See BEST,
supra note 302, at 266-85; see also MCCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 158, at 230-35
(noting modern warfare raises the "difficult" questions about the use of sophisticated weap-
ons).
306. This claim was somewhat misleading; in fact, "smart" weapons represented a
fraction of the overall ordinance used. See Normand & Jochnick, supra note 198, at 292
n.18.
307. See supra note 15 (citing relevant treaties).
308. See DOD Iraq Report, supra note 54, at 624-27 (discussing different interpreta-
tions arising from the application of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions); see also
MCCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 158, at 230-35.
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the target notwithstanding that character. 3°9 The stated military objective
in bombing the shelter was to disrupt communications and destroy a
link in the command structure. The United States acknowledged its
awareness of the prior civilian character of the shelter, but claimed it
was ignorant of the current civilian use. An investigation might be re-
quired to determine the truth or reasonableness of these assertions, and
thus whether aprimafacie violation of the Statute has occurred.
Assuming the attack constitutes an international armed conflict, the
Sudan bombing presents a weaker case for military necessity and pro-
portionality, and therefore a stronger chance of prosecution. The stated
military objective in attacking the Khartoum plant was to prevent Sudan
from creating weapons that might be used against the U.S. The U.S. has
acknowledged its understanding of the risks associated with bombing
the plant, located in a civilian neighborhood. An investigation into the
reasonableness of proceeding with the attack would be warranted; un-
like the Amariyah bombing, which was carried out during a sustained
war and conformed to recognized military objectives, the case is not
easily made that the Khartoum bombing was necessary. The stated risks
to the U.S., that bombs would be made there which likely would be used
against U.S. interests in the region, are attenuated, undermining the
claim of necessity. No resort was made to the United Nations, which
could have requested an investigation. This request would have obviated
the need for force at all and would have completely eliminated the risk
to civilians. It would, therefore, be appropriate for a Prosecutor to pro-
ceed with an investigation and recommend charges be heard .
C. The Iraq Bombardment Campaign
Alternatively, Iraq might challenge, on a collective basis, the deci-
sion to bombard any communications or command facilities, even
assuming their military character, given their location in predominantly
civilian centers. Were the potential military gains worth the risk of ci-
vilian casualties? While the United States can argue that the specific
result-civilian casualties-was inadvertent, it cannot deny that in Iraq
it elected to bomb targets in heavily populated areas, far from the Ku-
309. It is worth stressing here that the mere fact that civilian casualties resulted will not
in and of itself establish liability. Instead, liability must depend on the information actually
or reasonably available at the time the decision was made. See Finnan, supra note 299, at
366-74.
310. Even if considered under the provisions defining crimes against humanity, several
troubling questions are raised by the targeting of a suspected chemical weapons plant located
in a residential area. An argument could be advanced that the potentially devastating scope
of the attack, if indeed toxins were released into the environment, render it effectively an
attack on the civilian population.
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waiti theater of operations. The Yugoslavia Tribunal's ruling raises the
possibility that war crimes liability can arise from general defects in the
targeting system;311 that being so, the Prosecutor might find the case le-
gally sufficient and permit this hypothetical case to proceed, in
recognition of the developing state of the law, and to resolve questions
of what standards U.N. peacekeeping forces will be judged against.
The conclusion to be drawn is that it is indeed possible that the
United States would be required to defend itself against war crimes
charges under the Statute. But it is interesting to note what these exam-
ples remind us of: that the risk of war crimes liability is primarily
dependent upon the U.S. conduct.3' 2 Therefore, as was the case with the
analysis with respect to aggression, it should provide no disincentive to
U.S. participation in peacekeeping operations. This is as it should be.
The rules of war are supposed to be applied universally, regardless of
the circumstances of the conflict or the identity or characteristics of the
population at risk.
PART HI: "So WHERE IS THE EXPOSURE OF THE UNITED STATES?
3 13
Generalizing from the analysis presented above, the following can
be said about the risks to the United States of being unfairly subjected to
charges before the Criminal Court. The jurisdiction of the Court is un-
likely to interfere with peacekeeping initiatives sponsored by the
311. The questions involved have been summarized as follows with respect to the
bombardment of Iraq:
The central question was whether the incidental injury inflicted was "excessive" in
relation to the legitimate objective sought. Commentators who objected to any
military response to the Iraqi aggression in principle naturally considered the
campaign "excessive." Such an absolute view, however, merely transfers the en-
tire burden of suffering to the people of Kuwait through an extended, and possibly
permanent, atrocious occupation. In the immediate context a case may be made
out that the objectives of the bombardment were lawful and that, notwithstanding
some serious apparent errors, it was not conducted indiscriminately. The termina-
tion of the bombardment appears to have been decided in accordance with
applicable jus in bello principles, but it may equally be said that, had the bom-
bardment continued beyond the point of its actual termination, the criticism of
"excess" would soon have become unanswerable.
MCCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 158, at 234 (emphasis added). Were the "errors" excus-
able? Was the bombardment indeed "excessive"? These are the questions which would be
answered by an inquiry, setting clear standards for the inevitable next air campaign.
312. To the extent that the Security Council's role in the crisis is relevant (as in the
bombing of the Khartoum plant) the risks of liability arguably decrease as the Council be-
comes more active.
313. M. Cherif Bassiouni, quoted in James Podgers, War Crimes Court under Fire, 84
A.B.A. J. 64 (1998).
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Security Council under Chapter VII in response to illegal aggression. To
the contrary, it is in those circumstances that the precipitating event will
be open and notorious, and further that Council action will represent a
broad consensus that force is appropriate to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace (even given the inherently politicized nature of the
Council). 34 Against this rich factual, political, and legal backdrop, with
the possible exception of some claims of humanitarian necessity, it is
consequently most likely that the Prosecutor will deem the case to be
inadmissible and that further proceedings are unwarranted. Charges of
illegal aggression which the Prosecutor will be most likely to investi-
gate are those where the United States is acting unilaterally, eschewing
resort to the mechanisms of the United Nations for reasons of expedi-
ency, or fear of insufficient international support.
On the other hand, with regard to war crimes allegations, the United
States' status as either peacekeeper or unilateral actor is largely irrele-
vant, as is anticipated by the humanitarian law of war, which seeks to
protect all involved civilians, regardless of affiliation or fault. Any li-
ability will arise solely from the means by which the war is conducted.
However, given the continuing development of the law regarding crimes
of this nature, it will be somewhat difficult for the United States to pre-
dict in advance what actions are legitimate, and what actions might
expose it to charges before the Court.
Thus, both with respect to certain charges of aggression and war
crimes violations it is likely the U.S. will have to defend its actions in
the Criminal Court. The last question to be addressed is whether this
risk is so unreasonable, given the United States' security responsibilities
as the only current superpower, as to warrant substantial modification of
the Statute or U.S. non-participation.
A. The Uncertainty Factor
The United States fairly objects to the failure of the Statute to define
aggression and might reasonably object to the possibility that develop-
ing standards of the law of war crimes will subject the U.S. to
unanticipated liability. The means of addressing the first criticism is
within the power of the United States: it can ratify the treaty and thereby
participate in the development of the definition of aggression.3"5 A
314. To note agreement that force is "an appropriate" response is not meant to suggest
that it represents agreement that it is the best response.
315. A colleague wonders if incorporating into the definition of aggression the limita-
tion that only state parties may bring claims to the attention of the Court (foreclosing proprio
motu jurisdiction by the Prosecutor) will alleviate some of the American concerns. The an-
swer: probably not. As the analysis demonstrates, the risk of U.S. liability for the crime of
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similarly effective means is also available with regard to any uncer-
tainty arising from possible unexpected war crimes liability: the U.S.
could ratify the Statute and opt out of war crimes jurisdiction for seven
years; if a sufficient number of other countries accept war crimes juris-
diction and enough cases with war crimes charges are prosecuted, the
United States would have the opportunity to see how the law responds
to the challenges of modem warfare. Finally, through ratification the
United States would have the ability to participate in the nomination and
selection of judges and further influence the jurisprudential develop-
ment of the Criminal Court. The U.S. could follow this course with little
risk to itself, by withdrawing from the Statute if it concludes the Court
is diverging from accepted principles of international law.
31 6
However, the U.S. refusal to consider any of these alternatives to
non-participation might be indicative of a fundamental disagreement the
U.S. has with the Criminal Court: its potential to contribute to the de-
velopment of international common law principles. As many of the
American objections reveal,317 the U.S. prefers the development of in-
ternational law be accomplished through the positive actions by states-
that is, for treaties to clearly set forth obligations. The Rome Statute is
fundamentally incompatible with that view of international law, and
minor tinkering will not resolve that irreconcilable difference.
aggression lies in the nature of the incident to which it is responding, whether the interna-
tional community concurs in its assessment of whether the resort to armed force was
appropriate, and whether the injured state considers its sovereignty or territorial or political
integrity had been affected. More importantly, as the humanitarian intervention example of
the Balkans shows, the receptiveness of the "targeted" state to the deployment of troops will
play an important role in the prosecution of charges of aggression. In either case the coop-
eration of the putative injured state, as the real party in interest, will be crucial to the pursuit
of charges; accordingly the requirement that only states may bring charges to the attention of
the Prosecutor will make no meaningful difference.
In addition, there are rare but not unforeseeable circumstances in which one might want
to permit the prosecution of crimes of aggression to proceed notwithstanding the non-
cooperation of the injured state. For example, one could imagine Saddam Hussein being
somewhat indifferent to air-strikes by Turkey which decimated the Kurdish opposition in
northern Iraq. Should the Prosecutor be estopped from investigating an apparent, serious
violation of the law simply because neither state involved values the victims? One might also
wish the Prosecutor to investigate and pursue charges of aggression arising from an attack on
the Palestinian controlled territories, which are unique in that they have no widely recog-
nized state authority, and therefore would be dependent upon the Prosecutor's proprio motu
jurisdiction.
316. I would not advocate this course, which would unfairly subvert the goals and prin-
ciples of the Criminal Court; I mention it only as a preferable alternative to the U.S.
announced policy of actively working against the Court.
317. Included would be the failure to define aggression before including it the Court's
jurisdiction, and the vehement objection to the exercise of jurisdiction over non-parties.
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B. Questions of Equality
The United States has asserted that it is fundamentally unfair that its
role as primary enforcer of international peace and security will subject
it to greater scrutiny by the Court. As the analysis suggests, with regard
to the charges of illegal aggression, it is when the United States is acting
unilaterally or without broad support of the international community
that it will most likely be subject to charges of aggression; when it is
acting as part of a collective response to open and notorious aggression
it will be immunized from prosecution through the Statute's anticipated
operation. Thus, if the United States has been called to action by the
international community because of its stature and authority as a super-
power, it should indeed be immunized from liability. The case has not
been made, however, to explain why that immunity should carry over
into circumstances when the U.S. is acting to respond to a questionable
claim of aggression, or in pursuit of its own national interests. If there is
no real or implied precondition of agency, U.S. officials and command-
ers should indeed be held responsible for breaches of the peace
according to the same standards applicable to other states.
The argument is even more compelling with regard to possible war
crimes liability, which speaks to how the war is conducted. If the United
States is in fact disproportionately called upon to exert its military
might in the interests of international peace and security, to immunize
the U.S. from strict application of the law of jus in bello would under-
mine, indeed, eviscerate, the law. Moreover, such an exception to
liability would be incompatible with the purposes of jus in bello, which
is to protect civilians and soldiers regardless of the fault (or here, the
putative nobility) of the states involved in the conflict.
Finally, in either case, by seriously pursuing these claims in its
military and domestic courts, the U.S. could take advantage of the com-
plementary jurisdiction provisions and avoid international liability. This
would require the U.S. to recognize the authority and legitimacy of the
international community's interest in these matters. To give meaning to
those interests, the U.S. would have to incorporate respect for these in-
ternational norms into its domestic military command structure, and
permit the judicial branches to apply those norms without the unques-
tioning deference to the political and military branches previously
displayed. While these changes are significant and advance the interests
of the U.N. system, they are not inappropriate.
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C. Unresolved Questions
Ultimately, the most compelling concern is one that has not been
articulated with any particularity by the U.S.: that U.S. participation in
humanitarian missions which are imposed on the targeted state poses a
significant risk to the U.S. of unfair liability, and that it may further be
subject to liability for civilian casualties in circumstances not clearly
covered by jus in bello. The question is, what is the most appropriate
response to uncertainty under the law-liability or no liability?3.8 There
is no way to alleviate this risk through amending the Statute. It would be
difficult if not impossible to legislate circumstances of the sort pre-
sented by the examples considered in this Article thereby foreclosing
amendment of the definitions of crimes. Moreover, any attempt to do so
through changes in procedure would eviscerate the principles of Court
independence already incorporated into the Court's proposed mecha-
nisms and jurisdiction.
An attempt to explicitly include the exception in the definition of
aggression would simply shift the inquiry from "Is there a humanitarian
exception to charges of aggression" to "Is this a valid humanitarian cri-
sis?" An inquiry would still be necessary to answer the question.
Furthermore, the explicit acknowledgment of humanitarian intervention
as an exception to criminal liability would encourage states to cast oth-
erwise illegal or questionable action as humanitarian in intent, much as
nations now attempt to cast the use of armed force as valid self defense.
In the case of crimes against humanity and war crimes liability, it is
worth noting that questions as to the scope of these norms will need to
be resolved within or without the ICC system. The definition of war
crimes (and other crimes), as well as the resulting confusion from its
application, is borrowed from preexisting obligations, with which U.S.
armed forces must comport, whether or not it is party to the Statute. In
an attempt to provide a procedural solution to these types of problems,
the parties might adopt a provision that permanently (rather than tempo-
rarily, as the Statute now permits) excludes jurisdiction over charges
upon the request of the Council pursuant to a Chapter VII finding of a
breach of international peace and security. This exclusion would limit
that power both to claims involving charges of aggression, and to those
circumstances where "humanitarian considerations require a collective
318. It is worth noting that the American domestic law experience cuts both ways-
while there is no liability for ex post facto laws, the U.S. Constitution does not prohibit
courts (and prosecutors) from interpreting available laws expansively.
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response." This might alleviate the problems of uncertainty, but would
319be contrary to the principle that the Court is an independent organ.
Non-participation would limit U.S. influence on the development of
these norms to cases where it is defending itself; it will not participate in
the definition of the crime of aggression, nor the process for selecting
the judges who will ultimately make this crucial determination (except
to the extent that it can prevail upon its allies). The benefits of contrib-
uting to those processes make it imperative that the U.S. join the
Statute. While the possibility of criminal liability is an important new
risk, U.S. forces are responsible for violations of the norms of jus ad
bello and jus in bello, and the U.S. should be seeking ways to bring its
military operations into conformity with emerging standards.
CONCLUSIONS
If we accept that participation in the Statute may pose a valid risk to
the United States peculiar to the U.S. because of its duties as the sole
superpower, does that risk alone justify the United States' refusal to
ratify the Statute? The answer to this question must be no. There is little
risk of liability for "malicious" charges: unfounded claims should not
survive the preliminary stages. There is a risk of "political" claims, but
political claims are not malicious when they are supported by the facts.
Because the facts giving rise to valid claims under the Statute necessar-
ily involve human suffering, it is in the interest of all of humanity that
such claims be dealt with thoughtfully, regardless of the identity of the
complaining state.
The American objections further reveal an important strength of the
Statute: it provides incentives for all states, whether or not they are
party to the Statute, to respect the intended role of the Security Council
in maintaining international peace and security.320 If the Council rises to
the task of responding effectively and fairly to the needs of those who
turn to it, there is no need to protect states participating in U.N.-
sponsored peacekeeping missions from liability for war crimes; it is the
obligation of all states involved in those operations to respect the rules
of jus in bello. For these reasons it is not only appropriate but impera-
tive that the United States be subject to the Court's jurisdiction, either
319. It might also encourage the Council to find humanitarian concerns where other-
wise none might truly exist, simply to immunize a state against liability.
320. Realistically, not every state appealing to the Security Council receives a fair
hearing of its complaints or just and appropriate remedy for its injuries-the Council is too
politicized for that. However, of the states which might complain about Council non-
responsiveness, the United States is not currently one.
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voluntarily or by operation of the extended jurisdictional provisions.
Who else should be subject to the jurisdiction of the Criminal Court for
war crimes and crimes of aggression but the "world's policeman," the
state which "constantly [has] troops serving abroad on humanitarian
missions, rescue operations or missions to destroy weapons of mass de-
struction. '321
The United States appeared willing to sweep aside all of its objec-
tions in favor of inclusion of a provision requiring Security Council
approval as a prerequisite to Court jurisdiction. This suggests a sinister
motivation for the objections: the refusal to submit to any higher
authority. Even if credible information suggests a crime has been com-
mitted, only the United States will be permitted to judge that conduct.
One can easily imagine the only scenario in which the U.S. will accede
to a superior authority: the albeit unlikely circumstance when it loses
the war. With this implicit rejection of universal application of the law,
the United States does significant damage to the development of inter-
national law. Indeed, the U.S. repudiates the principle of Nuremberg by
insisting that America (the state with the most political and military
power) should be exempt from the law: it really was victor's justice af-
ter all.
The implications for the international community are troubling. The
global international community is fragile, affected by past political dif-
ferences, economic interdependencies, environmental challenges, and
historical baggage. It is already strained by American pronouncements
of international law (which the U.S. apparently feels, in many circum-
stances, no obligation to follow itself); by American use of its political
and economic clout to ensure favorable outcomes in situations where its
own interests are implicated; by stated lack of respect for the United
Nations. To avoid further, perhaps irreparable fracture of the interna-
tional community, it is time for the United States to embrace, and not
repudiate, the ideals of Grotius.
321. David Scheffer, quoted in Caspar Weinberger, Commentary, FORBES, Aug. 24,
1998, at 41.
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APPENDIX A
[Crime of aggression
Note: This draft is without prejudice to the discussion of the issue of
the relationship of the Security Council with the International Criminal
Court with respect to aggression as dealt with in article 10.
Option 1
[For the purpose of the present Statute, the crime [of aggression]
[against peace] means any of the following acts committed by an indi-
vidual [who is in a position of exercising control or capable of directing
political/military action in a State]:
(a) planning,
(b) preparing,
(c) ordering,
(d) initiating, or
(e) carrying out
[an armed attack] [the use of armed force] [a war of aggression,] [a
war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agree-
ments or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy
for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing] by a State against the
[sovereignty,] territorial integrity [or political independence] of another
State [when this] [armed attack] [use of force] [is] [in contravention of
the Charter of the United Nations] [[in contravention of the Charter of
the United Nations as determined by the Security Council].]
Option 2
1. [For the purposes of this Statute, the crime of aggression is
committed by a person who is in a position of exercising
control or capable of directing political/military actions in
his State, against another State, in contravention to the
Charter of the United Nations, by resorting to armed force,
to threaten or violate the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
political independence of that State.]
[2. [Acts constituting [aggression] [armed attack] include the
following:] [Provided that the acts concerned or their con-
sequences are of sufficient gravity, acts constituting
aggression [are] [include] the following:]
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(a) the invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the
territory of another State, or any military occupation, how-
ever temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or
any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another
State or part thereof;
(b) bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the ter-
ritory of another State [, or the use of any weapons by a
State against the territory of another State];
(c) the blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed
forces of another State;
(d) an attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or
air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State;
(e) the use of armed forces of one State which are within the
territory of another State with the agreement of the receiv-
ing State in contravention of the conditions provided for in
the agreement, or any extension of their presence in such
territory beyond their termination of the agreement;
(f) the action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has
placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that
other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a
third State;
(g) the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands,
groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of
armed force against another State of such gravity as to
amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involve-
ment therein.]]
Option 3
[1. For the purpose of the present Statute [and subject to a de-
termination by the Security Council referred to in article 10,
paragraph 2, regarding the act of a State], the crime of ag-
gression means either of the following acts committed by an
individual who is in a position of exercising control or ca-
pable of directing the political or military action of a State:
(a) initiating, or
(b) carrying out an armed attack directed by a State against the
territorial integrity or political independence of another
State when this armed attack was undertaken in [manifest]
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contravention of the Charter of the United Nations [with the
object or result of establishing a [military] occupation of, or
annexing, the territory of such other State or part thereof by
armed forces of the attacking State.]
2. Where an attack under paragraph 1 has been committed, the
(a) planning,
(b) preparing, or
(c) ordering thereof by an individual who is in a position of ex-
ercising control or capable of directing the political or
military action of a State shall also constitute a crime of ag-
gression.]
